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Women have a great deal of potential political power' and are already
a major political force, consistently out-voting men since 1980.2 But ma-
jority voting power has not translated into the elimination of sex inequality,
to the consternation of some legal scholars.3 An obvious reason for this
paradox is centuries of entrenched culture, law, and judicial precedent that
discriminate against women.4 Another, less obvious reason for the power
paradox is that existing constitutional rights do not adequately protect wo-
men's autonomy and equality. "Women incompletely protected by those
liberties cannot be considered fully constituted citizens within our democ-
racy."5 This paper discusses one way to end this "partial citizenship" by
* Law Clerk to the Honorable Karen Nelson Moore, United States Court of Appeals
for the Sixth Circuit. Many thanks to Professor Laurence Tribe for supervising this paper,
which was written in connection with his spring 1998 seminar on alternatives to substantive
due process.
1. See generally NAOMI WOLF, FIRE WrT FIn: TnE NEW FEMALE POWER AND How
IT WILL CHANGE THE TwENTY-FIRST CENTURY 14 (1993) ('Though almost all discussions
of 'women's equality' presume that the goal of the struggle is 50-50 representation .... the
true figure for parity is the terrifying 51 percent to 49 percent. If voting trends continue,
women will have ten million to twelve million more votes than men will. According to the
Census Bureau, they now have seven million more.").
2. See WoLF, supra note 1, at 10.
3. See, e.g., JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL
REvIEw 164 (1980). At current rates, it will take over 300 years for women to achieve
parity in public offices. See WOLF, supra note 1, at 14 ("If we trust to 'progress,' we will
languish in the low forties of representation forever.").
4. The role of judicial precedent in perpetuating sex discrimination has prompted one
feminist scholar to advocate doing away with most judicial review of sex classifications and
relying solely on women's political power to achieve sex equality. See Mary Becker, Con-
servative Free Speech and the Uneasy Case for Judicial Review, 64 U. COLO. L. REv. 975,
979-81 (1993).
5. Tracy E. Higgins, Democracy and Feminism, 110 HARv. L. REv. 1657, 1681
(1997).
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encouraging Congress to use its power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment to promote equal citizenship for women.
When Congress wants to promote equality, it usually relies on the
Interstate Commerce Clause or, less frequently, its power to enforce the
Equal Protection Clause. The Commerce Clause seems appropriate when
Congress regulates, for example, discrimination in employment. Laws that
regulate intra-state activity a step removed from commerce-where Con-
gress's power is based on the effects of the regulated activity on com-
merce-are on shakier ground doctrinally, in light of United States v.
Lopez,6 and are less satisfying in principle.7 For example, one has the
sense that the equality and dignity concerns behind the Violence Against
Women Act' (VAWA) should "occup[y] a more protected position in our
constitutional system than does the movement of cattle, fruit, steel and coal
across state lines."9 In instances where equality concerns predominate,
Congress often invokes its power to enforce the Equal Protection Clause as
a secondary justification. This power is also the usual basis for applying
employment discrimination law to the states. 10 However, the Supreme
Court's decision in City of Boerne v. Flores" indicated that Congress's
power in this area may be less than it has assumed. In particular, Congress
will have difficulty using the Equal Protection Clause when inequality is
rooted in difference, so that achieving equality requires accommodations
rather than mere formally neutral treatment as defined by the status quo.
Acting on the basis of Lopez and City of Boerne, the en banc Fourth
Circuit has struck down part of VAWA on the grounds that it is beyond the
scope of Congress's power under either the Commerce Clause or the Equal
Protection Clause.' 2 The Supreme Court may be poised to do the same. 3
This paper explores a third alternative: the possibility of promoting sex
6. 514 U.S. 549, 551 (1995) (st-iling down federal ban on guns in school zones as
beyond the scope of the commerce power).
7. Cf. CHARLEs L. BLACK, STRUcquRE AND RELATIONSHIP IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
55-58 [hereinafter BLACK, STRueTRE AND RELATIONSHIP] (discussing use of commerce
power to ban race discrimination in public accommodations).
8. Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322,
108 Stat. 1796 (1994) (codified in scattered sections of 8, 18, & 42 U.S.C.).
9. Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160, 177 (1941) (Douglas, J., concurring) (referring
to the right to move between states).
10. See United States v. Chicago, 573 F.2d 416, 422-23 (7th Cir. 1978) (holding that
Section 5 gave Congress the power to make Title VII fully applicable to state and local
govermments).
11. 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
12. See Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic Inst. & State Univ., 169 F.3d 820 (4th Cir.
1999) (en banc), cert. granted, - S. Ct. _ (1999).
13. The Supreme Court heard oral argument in the Brzonkala case on January 11, 2000,
the same day it decided Kimel v. Florida Board of Regents, discussed infra note 82.
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equality by enforcing and giving substantive content to the Citizenship
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
The first step of this argument is that the Citizenship Clause-"All
persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdic-
tion thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they
reside"-should have a substantive meaning that Congress can enforce.
The second step is that this understanding of the Citizenship Clause is a
better way to justify VAWA than are theories about the Commerce Clause
or the Equal Protection Clause. In Part II of this paper, I describe the
content of Congress's Section 5 power. In Parts mI through V, I give a
series of examples of how Congress might use this power to enforce the
Equal Protection and Citizenship Clauses. Part III considers whether the
Pregnancy Discrimination Act,14 as applied to the states, is a valid measure
to enforce the Equal Protection Clause. Part IV considers a hypothetical
federal law abolishing state immunities for interspousal torts and rapes. I
use this example as a model for enforcing the Citizenship Clause. Part V
examines two versions of the civil rights remedy of the Violence Against
Women Act, one that Congress considered but rejected and one that was
enacted. By comparing these two remedies, I show that the enacted ver-
sion is better understood under the Citizenship Clause than under Equal
Protection.
II. Congressional Power Under Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment
Section 1. All persons born or naturalized in the United States,
and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United
States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make
or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immuni-
ties of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive
any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal pro-
tection of the laws.
Section 5. The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appro-
priate legislation, the provisions of this article.15
Congress has used its powers to enforce the Civil War Amendments
to protect a variety of political and economic rights. Section 5 of the Four-
teenth Amendment is the most frequently invoked source of power and is
linked to the broadest range of constitutional rights. There are limits, how-
14. 42 U.S.C. §2000e-(k) (1998).
15. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, §§ 1, 5.
19981
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ever, to how and when Congress may go about protecting these rights. The
Supreme Court has experimented with three rationales for deciding where
these limits should be drawn. The first rationale allows Congress to take
direct remedial or preventive action against violations of the Constitu-
tion.16 The second would let Congress expand the scope of constitutional
rights beyond what the Fourteenth Amendment requires. 7 However, this
second approach was rejected in City of Boerne, which held that the Reli-
gious Freedom Restoration Act"8 (RFRA) was unconstitutional. Under the
final rationale, Congress can act indirectly against the risk of violation by
creating statutory rights that tend to preserve constitutional ones."9 Under
any of these rationales, Congress's efforts to enforce the Fourteenth
Amendment must be "congruent" and "proportional" to the constitutional
injury that Congress is preventing or remedying.20
A. Congressional Prevention and Response to Particular Constitutional
Violations
The first rationale is the most direct: Congress can pass laws against
violations of the Constitution. In its simplest form, this power merely al-
lows Congress to prohibit what the courts would also prohibit. For exam-
ple, if a state violates the Equal Protection Clause by discriminating among
candidates for state employment on the basis of religion, Congress can give
the victims of that discrimination relief, such as the right to sue for
damages.2'
Under this rationale, Congress may also take steps to prevent constitu-
tional violations that are likely to occur, even though there has not yet been
an actual violation. Congress has used this approach-direct prohibition of
probable violations-to enforce the Fifteenth Amendment, and in City of
Boerne, the Court cited such usage as a model for exercising Congress's
Fourteenth Amendment power.22 A leading case in the context of the Fif-
teenth Amendment, South Carolina v. Katzenbach,23 dealt with provisions
of the Voting Rights Act of 1965.24 These provisions authorized the Attor-
16. See infra text accompanying notes 21-27.
17. See Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641,653-56 (1966); see infra text accompany-
ing notes 28-52.
18. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1988, 2000bb-2000bb4 (1998).
19. See Morgan, 384 U.S. at 652-53; see infra text accompanying notes 53-69.
20. See City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 511 ("There must be a congruence and proportional-
ity between the injury to be prevented or remedied and the means adopted to that end.").
21. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e, 2000e-2 (1998) (outlawing discrimination in employment,
including state government employment).
22. See City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 518.
23. 383 U.S. 301 (1966).
24. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971, 1973, 1973a-p (1998).
[Vol. 8:51
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ney General to suspend a wide range of voter-eligibility tests, pending judi-
cial review, in any state where census information suggested a pattern of
racial discrimination in voter registration. 5 The problem that had inspired
Congress to pass such a preventive measure was that, previously, the only
way to invalidate discriminatory tests was through expensive and time-con-
suming litigation. Several states were prepared to impose new require-
ments "as fast as existing laws were held unconstitutional, thus delaying
Negro voting for the duration of each round of litigation."26 The suspen-
sion provisions were valid because "there [was] reason to believe that
many of the laws affected... [had] a significant likelihood of being uncon-
stitutional."2 7 Congress's measures were "congruent" to actual constitu-
tional violations in need of remedy or prevention and "proportionate" to
the scope of the danger.
B. Congressional Expansion of Fourteenth Amendment Rights: The
Anti-Marbury Rationale of Katzenbach v. Morgan
South Carolina v. Katzenbach serves as the model for the direct ap-
proach to preventing constitutional violations and gives Congress as well
as the courts a role in enforcing the Constitution. It is an example of one of
the primary benefits of Section 5: it allows constitutional rights to be en-
forced through the mechanisms available to Congress as well as those
available to the courts. The direct approach does not, however, allow Con-
gress to participate in defining the scope of constitutional rights. The sec-
ond rationale does just that.
The second rationale first appeared in Katzenbach v. Morgan,28 the
leading modem case testing the limits of Congress's Section 5 power.
Morgan upheld Section 4(e) of the Voting Rights Act, which exempted
certain Puerto Rican immigrants from having to pass English-literacy tests
in order to vote in any state.29 Registered New York voters sued to pre-
serve the state's literacy test and prevent those immigrants who could not
pass it from voting.3 0 The Supreme Court assumed, as it had previously
held,3' that use of a literacy test did not in itself violate the Equal Protec-
25. See South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 315-16.
26. Archibald Cox, The Supreme Court 1965 Term-Forward: Constitutional Adjudica-
tion, 80 HA&v. L. REv. 91, 99 (1966) (citing United States v. Mississippi, 229 F. Supp. 925,
996-97 (S.D. Miss. 1964) (dissenting opinion)).
27. City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 532 (citing City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156,
177 (1980)).
28. 384 U.S. 641 (1966).
29. See id. at 643-46.
30. See id. at 643-44.
31. See Lassiter v. Northampton County Bd. of Elections, 360 U.S. 45 (1959).
1998]
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tion Clause.32 In an apparent contradiction, it nonetheless held that the
Section 4(e) exemption was a valid exercise of Congress's power to en-
force the Equal Protection Clause.
33
Justice Brennan's opinion for the Court offered two rationales for al-
lowing Congress to expand the scope of the Equal Protection Clause. The
first and primary rationale was that Congress was using the Voting Rights
Act to protect other rights indirectly; I discuss this "preservative" rationale
below.34 A secondary rationale suggested that Congress is more qualified
than the Court to identify certain kinds of constitutional violations.3 5 Vio-
lation of the Equal Protection Clause, wrote Justice Brennan, depends on
the existence of discriminatory intent, a factual question, and the Court
deferred to Congress's assessment of the facts.36 To uphold the Act, the
Court needed only to "perceive a basis upon which Congress might predi-
cate a judgment that application of New York's English literacy require-
ment.., constituted an invidious discrimination in violation of the Equal
Protection Clause."'37 After all, in Lassiter the Court had left open the pos-
sibility that it would strike down a literacy test if it were "fair on its face
[but] employed to perpetuate that discrimination which the Fifteenth
Amendment was designed to uproot. '38 Rather than requiring an aspiring
voter to prove in court that a particular state's literacy test was, in fact, so
employed, Justice Brennan was willing to take Congress's word for it.
In his separate opinion in Oregon v. Mitchell,39 Justice Brennan,
joined by Justices White and Marshall, expanded on this rationale, going
further with his suggestion that Congress may interpret the Constitution
and impose its interpretation on the states. He explained that the Court is
often reluctant to find a violation of the Equal Protection Clause because of
the Court's institutional limitations.4" When deciding how old people must
be in order to vote, one of the issues in Mitchell, any line will be arbitrary,
32. See Morgan, 384 U.S. at 649.
33. See id. at 652.
34. See infra Section 11(c).
35. See Morgan, 384 U.S. at 653-56.
36. See id. at 654-55 ("Congress might well have questioned [the purpose of the literacy
requirement] in light of the many exemptions provided, and some evidence suggesting that
prejudice played a prominent role in the enactment of the requirement.") (footnotes
omitted).
37. Id. at 656.
38. Lassiter v. Northampton County Bd. of Elections, 360 U.S. 45, 53 (1959).
39. 400 U.S. 112, 229 (1970) (holding that Congress could lower the voting age for
national elections from 21 to 18).
40. See id. at 246-49 (Brennan, J., concurring and dissenting) ("The Court's limitation
on judicial review of state legislation [stems] from the nature of judicial review.").
(Vol. 8:51
Women and the Promise of Equal Citizenship
and selecting a cut-off age is a task more suited to a legislature.41 Based on
this reasoning, the three justices were willing to uphold Congress's power
under the Equal Protection Clause to give eighteen-year-olds the right to
vote, without reaching the question of whether it was constitutional for
states to set the cut-off at age twenty-one. 42 It was enough that Congress
had found a violation.
Justice Brennan's suggestion that Congress can expand the scope of
protected rights under the Fourteenth Amendment has been strongly criti-
cized both as impractical43 and as contrary to Marbury v. Madison.' Ulti-
mately, in City of Boerne, the Court repudiated this rationale for Morgan
and struck down the RFRA, which was Congress's attempt to expand on
the Court's interpretation of the Free Exercise Clause.45 In Employment
Division v. Smith,4 6 the Court had held that most facially neutral laws are
valid even if they burden the exercise of a particular religion."7 Congress
reacted with RFRA, in which it insisted that any state law substantially
burdening religion be subjected to a "compelling interest" test.4" The
Court held that Congress could not expand the states' duties under the
41. See id. at 240 (Brennan, J., concurring and dissenting) ("It is clear to us that proper
regard for the special function of Congress in making determinations of legislative fact
compels this Court to respect those determinations.").
42. See id. at 229-31.
43. See William Cohen, Congressional Power to Interpret Due Process and Equal Pro-
tection, 27 STAN. L. REv. 603, 606-07 (1975) (summarizing problems in identifying when
Congress is expanding constitutional rights and when it is diluting them).
44. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803) ("It is emphatically the province and duty of the
judicial department to say what the law is."). See also Morgan, 384 U.S. at 667 (Harlan, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that "whether there has in fact been an infringement of [the Constitu-
tion is] for the judicial branch ultimately to determine"); Cohen, supra note 43, at 605
("While the court [has] given large latitude to Congressional judgments about appropriate
means to accomplish constitutionally defined ends, it [has] never before conceded to Con-
gress the task of interpreting the meaning of the constitutional text."); but cf Henry P.
Monaghan, The Supreme Court-Forward: Constitutional Common Law, 89 HARv. L. REv.
1 (1975) (proposing a limited role for Congress in defining scope of liberties).
45. See City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 512-15, 527-28 (discussing Congress's reasons for
passing RFRA and rejecting this aspect of Morgan).
46. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
47. See id. at 878 (rejecting the contention that religious use of peyote must be ex-
empted from otherwise constitutional laws not aimed at religious practices).
48. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(b)(1) (1999). RFRA prohibited state governments from
imposing a "substantial burden" on a person's exercise of religion unless the burden "(1) is
in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and (2) is the least restrictive means
of furthering that compelling governmental interest." 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1. The main pur-
pose of RFRA was "to restore the compelling interest test as set forth in Sherbert v. Verner,
374 U.S. 398 (1963) and Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) and to guarantee its
application in all cases where free exercise of religion is substantially burdened." 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000bb(b). Actually, the test demanded by RFRA was stricter than the Sherbert and
Yoder test.
1998]
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Fourteenth Amendment.49 It acknowledged Morgan's implication to the
contrary but stated that interpreting Morgan to allow Congress to define
the scope of constitutional rights was not "a necessary interpretation or
even the best one."50 Concluding that Congress could not expand Four-
teenth Amendment rights, the Court treated RFRA under only the direct,
South Carolina v. Katzenbach approach." Because RFRA aimed not at
weeding out intentional discrimination but at the incidental burdens im-
posed by neutral laws, RFRA did not "enforce" any constitutional prohibi-
tion.52 The sweep of the prohibition was out of proportion to any pattern
of actual violations Congress might seek to remedy, and it was therefore
beyond the scope of Section 5.
C. Congressional Protection of Fourteenth Amendment Values: The
Preferred Rationale of Katzenbach v. Morgan
The primary rationale for the holding of Morgan is the preservative
rationale, alluded to above. The preservative rationale has not been tested
since Morgan. It appears to allow Congress to create statutory rights when
doing so will have the indirect effect of "preserving" Fourteenth Amend-
ment rights against potential infringement. Under this approach, Congress
need not limit itself to directly remedying violations of the Constitution as
in South Carolina v. Katzenbach. In Morgan, this meant that Congress
could exempt Puerto Rican immigrants from the literacy test, thereby giv-
ing them the right to vote, because the vote is "preservative of all rights."53
That is, the vote would help Puerto Ricans combat ethnic discrimination
against their communities in the provision of government services. 54 It did
not matter that New York's English-literacy test was itself constitutional
because overriding that test was merely a means to the end of combating
intentional discrimination elsewhere. The Court allowed Congress to say,
in effect, that it understood New York's reasons for wanting to test its
voters for English literacy but was concerned that the test exacerbated con-
ditions conducive to unconstitutional discrimination against minority com-
munities. Congress could override the obstacle to voting because doing so
would lessen the risk of discrimination in public services by enabling its
victims to exert power over the perpetrators.
49. See City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 527.
50. Id. at 528.
51. See id. at 529-35.
52. See id.
53. Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 652 (1966) (quoting Yick Wo v. Hopkins,
118 U.S. 356, 370 (1886)).
54. See id. at 652 ('This enhanced political power will be helpful in gaining nondis-
criminatory treatment in public services for the entire Puerto Rican community.").
[Vol. 8:51
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There were important conditions in Morgan that allowed the Court to
identify how the vote would preserve other rights. First, discrimination in
the provision of government services is made possible and more likely by
residential segregation." Puerto Rican immigrants in New York were a
"discrete and insular minorit[y],"'56 or so the Court assumed. Second, dis-
crimination against a community in services like garbage collection or po-
lice protection is tangible and public. The harm is visible, as is the fact that
it is a group and not just an individual that is harmed. It is also a type of
harm well suited to correction through political processes because the same
features that make a community susceptible to discrimination-discrete-
ness and insularity-also provide a basis for political organization. Giving
votes to the victims gives them the power to help themselves.
These conditions explain the power gained through the right to vote,
but it would not make sense if the only statutory right Congress could cre-
ate under the preservative rationale was an "extra" right to vote. After all,
the Morgan Court assumed that Lassiter was correct and that neither the
Fourteenth nor the Fifteenth Amendment forbade literacy tests in general.57
To allow such a limitation on the right to vote, as long as there is no evi-
dence that it is a pretext for intentional discrimination, is to imply that the
people excluded might reasonably be seen as so unqualified to vote as to
justify denying them the power to protect their interests as citizens. Per-
mitting Congress to say that this was not true with respect to the Puerto
Rican community seems to conflict with Lassiter's holding that literacy
tests are facially constitutional. By observing that the vote is preservative
of other rights, the preservative rationale for enforcing the Equal Protection
Clause gives Congress a way to circumvent limits on its Fifteenth Amend-
ment enforcement power. If Morgan and its "preservative" rationale are to
be meaningful as a distinct method for enforcing the Fourteenth Amend-
ment-and the City of Boerne Court clearly preferred the preservative ra-
55. See Cox, supra note 26, at 102 (suggesting that "a law prohibiting discrimination
against Negroes in the sale and rental of housing could well be viewed as a means of
bringing about the break-up of the urban ghettoes which are serious obstacles to the states'
performance of their constitutional duty not to discriminate in the quality of.. .public
services").
56. United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938) (sug-
gesting that discrimination against minorities warrants heightened review because political
processes may fail to protect them). Of course, the analysis described in this paragraph
turns the theory of the Carolene Products footnote on its head. The same features that may
make a group of people the target of discrimination may also, in the right circumstances,
enable political mobilization that is more difficult when the group is "anonymous" or "dif-
fuse." See Bruce Ackerman, Beyond Carolene Products, 98 HAgv. L. REv. 713, 722-31
(1985).
57. See Morgan, 384 U.S. at 649.
1998]
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tionale for Morgan to its alternative rationale 58-then the preservative
rationale must mean something more than giving out votes. Section 5
power thus includes the power to outlaw direct constitutional violations-
the South Carolina v. Katzenbach approach-and the power to preserve
Fourteenth Amendment rights-by giving out votes in situations like Mor-
gan, and by other means not yet explored.
Assuming, then, that the preservative rationale in Morgan implies a
general power for Congress to prevent state opportunities to discriminate,
what form might that power take? Professor Archibald Cox has suggested
that because segregation is conducive to discrimination in government
services, the real problem in Morgan-like cases is residential segregation.59
To help reduce defacto segregation so as to reduce discrimination in public
services, could Congress use the Morgan rationale to ban racial discrimina-
tion in the sale or rental of private housing? To answer, we must decide
two questions: (1) may Congress act directly on private persons not bound
by the Equal Protection Clause, and (2) how much deference will the
courts give to Congress in determining what measures are "necessary and
proper"60 to protect Fourteenth Amendment rights against lurking
deprivations?
In the same year Morgan was decided, six justices, in two opinions in
United States v. Guest,6 indicated that "there now can be no doubt that the
specific language of § 5 empowers the Congress to enact laws punishing
all conspiracies-with or without state action-that interfere with Four-
58. See City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 527-28.
59. See Cox, supra note 26, at 102 ("[U]rban ghettos ... are serious obstacles to the
states' performance of their constitutional duty not to discriminate in the quality of educa-
tion and other public services."); see also J. Edmond Nathanson, Congressional Power to
Contradict the Supreme Court's Constitutional Decisions: Accommodation of Rights in
Conflict, 27 WM. & MARY L. Rev. 331, 340-41 (1986) (discussing attempts to justify Mor-
gan on the basis of Congress's superior fact-finding abilities). For additional suggestions of
ways to use Section 5 power, see Cox, supra note 26, at 107-08 (proposing congressional
action against de facto school segregation and enactment of a national code of criminal
procedure).
When Congress banned race discrimination in private housing markets, in the Fair
Housing Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. § 3601 et seq., the Act was upheld as an exercise of Con-
gress's power under the Thirteenth Amendment. See, e.g., Williams v. Matthews Co., 499
F.2d 819 (8th Cir. 1974); United States v. Hunter, 459 F.2d 205 (4th Cir. 1972). When
challenged, extensions of the Fair Housing Act to cover other kinds of discrimination have
been upheld under the commerce power. See, e.g., United States v. Weiss, 847 F. Supp.
819 (D. Nev. 1994) (family status); Pulcinella v. Ridley Township, 822 F. Supp. 204 (E.D.
Pa. 1993) (disability).
60. See U.S. CONsT., art. I § 8. In Morgan, the Court indicated that Section 5 granted
"the same broad powers expressed in the Necessary and Proper Clause." Morgan, 384 U.S.
at 651.
61. 383 U.S. 745 (1966).
[Vol. 8:51
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teenth Amendment rights."6 2 This declaration was in the same spirit as
Morgan's preservative rationale and is consistent with the vision of the
Fourteenth Amendment's framers.63 Nonetheless, the Fourth Circuit's
Brzonkala decision,6 which struck down the civil rights remedy of the
Violence Against Women Act, rested heavily on the court's insistence that
Section 5 does not empower Congress to act on private individuals who are
not acting under color of state law. Surprisingly, the court repeatedly cited
City of Boerne as authority for its position.65 RFRA dealt exclusively with
state actions, and the Court therefore had little cause to discuss this issue.6 6
The Fourth Circuit, however, conflated the state action doctrine with the
proposition that Congress's power under Section 5 is not definitional, the
central issue in City of Boerne. This conflation would make sense under
the South Carolina v. Katzenbach approach to enforcing the Fourteenth
Amendment, which allows for direct action against actual or potential vio-
62. Id. at 762 (Clark, J., concurring, joined by Black and Fortas, JJ.); see also id. at 774
(Brennan, J., concurring and dissenting, joined by Warren, C.J., and Douglas, J.). This
dictum was reiterated in the opinion of the Court in District of Columbia v. Carter, 409 U.S.
418, 424 n.9 (1973).
The Fourth Circuit's Brzonkala opinion argued that in addition to being dicta, the jus-
tices' comments in Guest and Carter cannot be relied on because the Carter footnote cites
Morgan. See Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic Inst. & State Univ., 169 F.3d 820, 879 (4th
Cir. 1999) (en banc), cert. granted, _ S. Ct. - (1999). In the Fourth Circuit's view, this
citation discredits the Court's statement because Morgan "expressed the view that Congress
may redefine the substantive provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment.. .- a view that...
has been rejected by the full Supreme Court [in City of Boerne]." Id. This argument reflects
the Brzonkala court's emphasis on the alternative, anti-Marbury rationale of Morgan and its
failure to acknowledge the primary, preservative rationale. Indeed, the Fourth Circuit ap-
pears to be unaware of Morgan's primary rationale, despite the City of Boerne Court's clear
delineation between that rationale and the alternative one it repudiated. See City of Boerne,
521 U.S. at 528-29.
63. See Laurent B. Frantz, Congressional Power to Enforce the Fourteenth Amendment
Against Private Acts, 73 YALE L.J. 1353, 1353-55, 1357 (1964) (stating that the framers
wrote in light of "settled constitutional doctrine" that Congress has implied power to pre-
vent private, but not necessarily state, interference with constitutional rights and expected
Congress to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment more than the courts); see also James M.
McGoldrick, The Civil Rights Cases: The Relevancy of Reversing a Hundred Plus Year Old
Error, 42 ST. Louis U.L.J. 451, 452 (1998) (arguing that the historical record indicates that
Section 5 "was not intended to be limited by the 'state action' concept found in § 1 of the
Fourteenth Amendment").
64. See Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic Inst. & State Univ., 169 F.3d 820 (4th Cir.
1999) (en banc), cert. granted, __ S. Ct. - (1999).
65. See, e.g., id. at 863-64, 875.
66. In fact, in another provocative aside on this issue, the Court ended its discussion of
the Civil Rights Cases and other early pillars of the state action doctrine by citing Guest for
the proposition that "the specific holdings of these early cases might have been superseded
or modified." City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 525; but see Brzonkala, 169 F.3d at 879 (offering
an alternative explanation for this comment).
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lations, but it is inappropriate for the preservative rationale. The point of
the preservative rationale is that it allows Congress to de-couple its reme-
dial action from the targeted constitutional violation. Because Congress
can protect Fourteenth Amendment rights, whether or not targeted behavior
itself violates the Constitution, whether a law happens to affect private ac-
tion is not a talisman for unconstitutionality.
The second question was how much leeway Congress has to deter-
mine what measures are needed to protect constitutional rights from lurk-
ing violations. For example, in the housing scenario, would a ban on
private discrimination be too much of an intrusion into local affairs to be
justified by Section 5? The analysis of this question has been changed by
City of Boerne. The Court in Morgan noted that it would give substantial
deference to Congress's preservative uses of Section 5, "presumably be-
cause Congress can be counted on to represent and consider seriously the
interests of the states."67 Although at some point the connection between
government discrimination and the underlying conditions attacked by Con-
gress would become too attenuated to sustain Congress's power, such "dif-
ferences ... of degree" were for Congress to evaluate.68 The Court in City
of Boerne drew back from this highly deferential position and made clear
67. Nathanson, supra note 59, at 422-23; see Morgan, 384 U.S. at 653; see also Cox,
supra note 26, at 104. Professor Cox stated,
The Court's traditional task of umpiring the federal system and the weight of
respect for state government conceivably might have led it to strike for itself...
the balance between the costs of intrusion into local interests and the gains of the
statute's supposed tendency to bring about equality in state services. The domi-
nant theme of the Morgan opinion, drawing upon the analogy of the commerce
clause, is that the Court should defer to the congressional judgment, even upon
such questions, in reviewing legislation enacted under section 5.
Id. at 104. The Court's interest in its "traditional task" of enforcing the values of federalism
has fluctuated in recent decades. What Professor Cox saw as a deviation in Morgan ap-
peared normal to Mr. Nathanson twenty years later. The decision in City of Boerne fits in
with the revival in recent years of judicial enforcement of federalism. See, e.g., Alden v.
Maine, 119 S.Ct. 2240 (1999) (holding that Congress's Article I powers do not include the
power to subject non-consenting states to private suits for damages in state courts); Printz v.
United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997) (holding that Congress may not oblige state officers to
conduct background checks on prospective handgun purchasers); Seminole Tribe of Fla. v.
Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996) (holding that Congress cannot abrogate Eleventh Amendment
immunity pursuant to Indian Commerce Clause and overruling contrary case under Inter-
state Commdrce Clause); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (striking down fed-
eral ban on guns in school zones); Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 460 (1991) (imposing
"plain statement" rule of construction on congressional regulation of states pursuant to
either commerce or Fourteenth Amendment power, so that "[i]f Congress intends to alter
the 'usual constitutional balance between the States and the Federal Government' it must
make its intention to do so unmistakably clear in the language of the statute" (quoting
Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 242 (1985))).
68. Cox, supra note 26, at 117.
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that it would decide whether Congress's remedy is "congruent and propor-
tional" to Fourteenth Amendment harms.69
m. The Pregnancy Discrimination Act and the Equal Protection Clause
As interpreted through the "preservative" rationale of Morgan, the
Voting Rights Act and Professor Cox's housing discrimination law share
the goal of remedying a side-effect of segregation: the state's failure to
treat similarly situated people the same. This was not, however, the origi-
nal problem addressed by Section 4(e) of the Voting Rights Act. That
provision was aimed at a disparate impact problem: Puerto Rican immi-
grants were disproportionately harmed by New York's English-literacy re-
quirement. But because the Court had found, in Lassiter, that literacy tests
were facially constitutional,7" the problem of disparate impact-that is,
that the state was not accommodating people who were differently situated
with respect to English literacy-had to be translated into a problem
wherein the state was treating similarly situated people differently from
each other. Hence, Spanish-speakers were cast as similarly situated to
English-speakers with regard to government services like education and
police protection, and Congress had an opportunity to ensure that they be
treated the same. RFRA, in its attempt to protect differently situated reli-
gious groups, failed because it could not be translated into an attempt to
protect similarly situated people from discriminatory state treatment.
The Court's position in Employment Division v. Smith and its objec-
tions to RFRA in City of Boerne echo some of the most difficult cases of
sex discrimination: those instances where the Court perceives the discrimi-
nation as linked to inherent differences between women and men that can-
not be helped, rather than to subordination of women to men that can be
remedied. The clearest case of inherent difference is in the roles of women
and men in reproduction. The Pregnancy Discrimination Act7' (PDA) at-
69. City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 528-35; see Michael W. McConnell, Institutions and
Interpretation: A Critique of City of Boerne v. Flores, 111 HARv. L. RaV. 153, 166 (1997)
(describing the approach in City of Boerne as "typical of intermediate scrutiny" and noting
that the Court "made independent judgments regarding the risk and frequency of free exer-
cise violations under the Smith test, the fit between the constitutional evil and the statutory
remedy, and the degree of impact on traditional state functions").
70. See Lassiter v. Northampton County Bd. of Elections, 360 U.S. 45, 52-53 (1959).
71. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-(k) (1998). The PDA states,
The terms "because of sex" or "on the basis of sex" include, but are not limited to,
because of or on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions;
and women affected by pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions shall
be treated the same for all employment-related purposes, including receipt of ben-
efits under fringe benefit programs, as other persons not so affected but similar in
their ability or inability to work .... This subsection shall not require an em-
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tempts to nullify the effects of this difference on women's ability to partici-
pate in the public sphere. Recognizing that the terms of participation were
often written with only men's needs in mind, it mandates accommodation.
It does so by broadening the definition of discrimination "on account of...
sex" in Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 196472 to include discrimination
"on the basis of pregnancy."73 This extension of Title VII was at odds with
the Supreme Court's insistence in Geduldig v. Aiello74 and General Elec-
tric Co. v. Gilbert75 that classifications based on pregnancy do not impli-
cate sex equality. Although the Court had embraced the principle that
equality does not require identical treatment of people who are differently
situated,76 it refused to recognize that equality may demand comparable
treatment in the face of difference to prevent difference from being used as
an excuse for discrimination.77 Thus, the Court held that it was not sex
discrimination for a state's disability insurance plan to deny coverage for
disability due to normal pregnancy even while covering several similarly
disabling conditions that fall on both sexes and some that fall exclusively
or primarily on men.78
To most people, the discriminatory nature of this policy seems obvi-
ous. To the Court, however, if nature imposes a burden on women, the
state has no duty to alleviate it, even if it alleviates functionally similar
burdens on men. By enacting the PDA, "Congress rejected [this] implicit
measuring of women's entitlement to equality by a male standard. 79 Un-
fortunately, the PDA looks a lot like RFRA. The purpose of the PDA was
ployer to pay for health insurance benefits for abortion, except where the life of
the mother would be endangered if the fetus were carried to term, or except where
medical complications have arisen from an abortion.
Id.
72. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e - 2000e-17 (1998).
73. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-(k).
74. 417 U.S. 484 (1974) (holding that the failure of a state's employee insurance pro-
gram to cover pregnancy did not violate the Equal Protection Clause).
75. 429 U.S. 125 (1976) (extending Geduldig's analysis of the Equal Protection Clause
to the definition of sex discrimination in Title VII).
76. See infra note 100.
77. See Gilbert, 429 U.S. at 139 ("For all that appears, pregnancy-related disabilities
constitute an additional risk, unique to women, and the failure to compensate them for this
risk does not destroy the presumed parity of the benefits, accruing to men and women alike,
which results from the facially evenhanded inclusion of risks."); Geduldig, 417 U.S. at 496-
97 ("There is no risk from which men are protected and women are not.").
78. See Geduldig, 417 U.S. at 501 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (noting that state's plan
limited "the disabilities for which women workers may recover, while men receive full
compensation for all disabilities suffered, including those that affect only or primarily their
sex such as prostatectomies, circumcision, hemophilia, and gout").
79. CATHARnm A. MAcKwNON, FEMnIuSM UNMODIFIED 243 n.18 (1987) [hereinafter
MAcKINNON, FEMiISM].
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to overrule Gilbert,8" just as RFRA was an attempt to overrule Smith.8" In
the name of women's equality, Congress prohibited state benefit plans
from discriminating against pregnant workers, even though the Supreme
Court had held that such discrimination did not offend the Equal Protection
Clause. On its face the PDA would appear to be an unconstitutional at-
tempt by Congress to expand rights beyond what the Fourteenth Amend-
ment demands. Under City of Boerne, Section 5 cannot be the basis for
applying the PDA to the states unless the PDA is "congruent and propor-
tional" to a pattern or risk of constitutional violations-intentional discrim-
ination in violation of the Equal Protection Clause or infringement on some
other right.8"
Pregnancy discrimination is a special, extreme case of an employment
practice with a disparate impact on a protected group. Underlying
Geduldig was the rule of Washington v. Davis83 and Personnel Administra-
tor v. Feeney84 that a state violates the Equal Protection Clause only when
it has discriminatory intent. Under Title VII, Congress has gone further
with respect to not only pregnancy discrimination but all employment prac-
tices with disparate impacts on protected groups. In 1971, the Supreme
Court held that such practices were presumptively prohibited under Title
VII.85 This prohibition was applied to the states along with the rest of Title
80. See Isleboro Sch. Comm. v. Califano, 593 F.2d 424, 430 (1st Cir. 1979) (citing
legislative history indicating that the purpose of the PDA was to overturn Gilbert).
81. See City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 512-16 (reviewing legislative history of RFRA).
82. See id. at 520. The PDA, and the other disparate impact provisions of Title VII
discussed below, could technically be applied to the states through the Commerce Clause.
Compare Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985) (holding that
Commerce Clause empowers Congress to apply Fair Labor Standards Act to states), with
EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226 (1983) (holding that Commerce Clause empowers Con-
gress to apply Age Discrimination in Employment Act to states). However, Title VII is
now unenforceable against the states unless it is within the scope of Section 5. The
Supreme Court has held that a state cannot be sued without its consent under a federal
statute when the statute is based only on Congress's Article I powers. See Seminole Tribe
of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996) (immunity in federal courts); Alden v. Maine, 119
S.Ct. 2240 (1999) (immunity in the state's own courts). In Kimel v. Florida Board of Re-
gents, decided on January 11, 2000, the Court extended this rule to the Age Discrimination
in Employment Act, holding that because age is not a suspect classification under the Four-
teenth Amendment, the Act could not have been enacted under Section 5 and therefore
could not abrogate Eleventh Amendment immunity.
83. 426 U.S. 229 (1976) (holding that evidence that more white job applicants than
black applicants passed a written personnel test was not sufficient to establish a violation of
the equality component of the Fifth Amendment).
84. 442 U.S. 256 (1979) (holding that a state's hiring preference for veterans did not
violate the Equal Protection Clause merely because it disproportionately favored men).
85. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 432 (1971) ("[G]ood intent or ab-
sence of discriminatory intent does not redeem employment procedures or testing mecha-
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VII in 197286 and was codified by the Civil Rights Act of 1991.87 Once a
plaintiff demonstrates that an employment practice has a disparate impact
on the basis of a protected characteristic such as race or sex, the burden
shifts to the defendant "to demonstrate that the challenged practice is job
related ... and consistent with business necessity."88
While the Supreme Court has not addressed whether extension of the
disparate impact provisions of Title VII to state employers is constitutional,
the courts of appeals have held it to be a valid exercise of Section 5 power
under Morgan without much discussion,89 despite the discriminatory intent
requirement of the Equal Protection Clause. The Seventh Circuit was the
first to consider the issue, and it found the disparate-impact rule analogous
to the voting rights provisions upheld in Morgan because it was "undis-
puted that the 1972 Amendments to Titie VII [were] an enactment to en-
force the anti-discrimination prohibitions of the Equal Protection Clause
and were 'plainly adapted to that end."' 9 o This analysis embraces a broad
reading of Morgan not possible after City of Boerne, giving great deference
to Congress in its expansion of the states' duties and creation of a broad
remedy. In Davis and Feeney, as in Smith, the Court left it to the political
branches, both state and federal, to weed out the discriminatory effects of
facially neutral laws.91 City of Boerne makes clear that Congress may not
categorically hold the states to a higher standard.92
The disparate impact provisions of Title VII can apply to the states via
Section 5 only if they are meaningfully distinguishable from RFRA. Two
possible lines of formal distinction are apparent, but neither is fully satis-
nisms that operate as 'built-in headwinds' for minority groups and are unrelated to
measuring job capability.").
86. See Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440, 449 (1982).
87. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k) (1998).
88. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i) (1998).
89. See Matt Pawa, When the Supreme Court Restricts Constitutional Rights, Can Con-
gress Save Us? An Examination of Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, 141 U. PENN. L.
REv. 1029, 1088 (1993) (citing Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 630 F.2d 79, 88
(2d Cir. 1980); Scott v. City of Anniston, 597 F.2d 897, 899-900 (5th Cir. 1979); Blake v.
City of Los Angeles, 595 F.2d 1367, 1372-74 (9th Cir. 1979); United States v. City of
Chicago, 573 F.2d 416, 420-24 (7th Cir. 1978)).
90. United States v. City of Chicago, 573 F.2d 416, 423 (7th Cir. 1978).
91. See Feeney, 442 U.S. at 272 ("The calculus of effects, the manner in which a partic-
ular law reverberates in a society; is a legislative and not a judicial responsibility."); Davis,
426 U.S. at 248 (stating that imposing strict scrutiny on laws with racially disparate impacts
"would be far-reaching and would raise serious questions about, and perhaps invalidate, a
whole range of... statutes that may be more burdensome to the poor and to the average
black than to the more affluent white," so that "extension of the rule beyond those areas
where it is already applicable by reason of statute, such as in the field of public employ-
ment, should await legislative prescription").
92. See supra text accompanying notes 45-52.
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factory. First, Title VII deals with rights found in the Fourteenth Amend-
ment itself, whereas RFRA protected a right derived from the First
Amendment and later incorporated to apply to the states. Chief Justice
Rehnquist has suggested that Congress's enforcement power does not ex-
tend, or perhaps extends with less force, to rights that are merely incorpo-
rated.93 In City of Boerne, however, the Court treated the right freely to
exercise religion as a "provisio[n] of the Fourteenth Amendment" without
hesitation, indicating that the distinction played little or no role in the
Court's decision.94 Second, Title VII affects only the states' activities as
employers, whereas RFRA applied to all state and local enactments; RFRA
reached more core state functions than does Title VII. In discussing what
was wrong with RFRA, the Court emphasized its broad sweep, ensuring
"intrusion at every level of government, displacing laws and prohibiting
official actions of almost every description and regardless of subject mat-
ter."95 The Court also criticized RFRA for "curtailing [the states'] tradi-
tional general regulatory power."96 Title VII is much more constrained,
and since "proportionality" is a touchstone of the City of Boerne Court's
Section 5 analysis, the disparate impact provisions may be acceptable pro-
phylactics against intentional discrimination. While this difference of de-
gree may help distinguish Title VII from RFRA, it is in tension with the
Court's reluctance to engage in line-drawing between those state functions
that are core features of sovereignty and those that are less important and
more open to congressional tampering.97
Although the "core state functions" distinction seems unsatisfactory
on its own, it highlights how the Court's analysis in City of Boerne empha-
sized matters of degree. In contrast to the "compelling interest" test de-
manded by RFRA for all state legislation, Title VII applies only to
employment and imposes a much more lenient test. Under Title VII, the
state must show only that the challenged practice is job-related and consis-
tent with business necessity. As a way to identify possible instances of
intentional discrimination, the disparate impact provisions could arguably
fit the direct South Carolina v. Katzenbach model of Section 5 power.
93. See Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 717-18 (1978) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting)
("While the Court has held that the Fourteenth Amendment 'incorporates' the prohibition
against cruel and unusual punishment, it is not at all clear to me that Congress has the same
enforcement power under § 5 with respect to a constitutional provision which has merely
been judicially 'incorporated' into the Fourteenth Amendment that it has with respect to a
provision which was placed in that Amendment by the drafters.").
94. See City of Boerne, 521 U.S at 519-20.
95. Id. at 532.
96. Id. at 534.
97. See Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 545-57 (1985). But
cf. cases cited supra note 67.
1998]
Texas Journal of Women and the Law
When Congress extended Title VII to the states, it had found "'that wide-
spread discrimination against minorities exists in State and local govern-
ment employment."' 98 Subject to the Court's own evaluation of the scope
of this problem-and thus the "proportionality" of the Title VII remedy-a
burden-shifting scheme that requires a heightened showing of reasonable-
ness when a state employment practice burdens minorities is at least a ra-
tional "congruent" method for identifying instances of intentional
discrimination. In City of Boerne, the Court gave some indication that it
would uphold Title VII on this basis when it noted that RFRA's "substan-
tial burden" test was "not even a discriminatory effects or disparate impact
test."99
The particularity of the PDA, as opposed to the more general disparate
impact provisions, makes it more difficult to justify under the South Caro-
lina v. Katzenbach approach. The PDA imposes on states an affirmative
duty to level the playing field, which, if one assumes state employment is
otherwise sexually neutral, looks like giving women special treatment to
make up for their natural disadvantage. In its sex discrimination decisions,
the Court has indicated its general willingness to give legislatures discre-
tion in dealing with what it perceives as natural or inherent differences
between the sexes,"°° just as in Smith it left the way open for similar ac-
commodation of religion. However, there is no indication that Congress
was reacting to a widespread problem in which states, for example, ex-
cluded pregnancy-related conditions from disability plans in order to dis-
courage women from working. As in the case of Smith, RFRA, and City of
Boerne, the PDA was enacted because Congress disagreed with the Court
about whether default discrimination due to failure to accommodate differ-
ence was a constitutional problem.
If the PDA fails as a direct, South Carolina v. Katzenbach-type shield
against sex discrimination, it may still be valid if it indirectly protects some
other right in a preservative, Morgan-like fashion. In Cleveland Board of
Education v. LaFleur,1° ' the Supreme Court struck down a policy mandat-
ing unpaid leave for pregnant teachers not because it was a classification
98. Blake v. City of Los Angeles, 595 F.2d 1367, 1373 (9th Cir. 1979) (quoting H.R.
Rep. 92-238 (1972), reprinted in U.S.C.C.A.N. p. 2137, 2152).
99. City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 535.
100. See, e.g., Michael M. v. Sonoma County Superior Court, 450 U.S. 464, 471 (1981)
(holding that because women "suffer disproportionately the profound... consequences of
sexual activity," state may criminalize sex involving minor females but not sex involving
minor males); Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 335-36 (1977) (holding that a woman's
rapeability, treated as inherent and referred to by the Court as "her womanhood," is ade-
quate grounds for excluding her from job in a "contact position" at a prison).
101. 414 U.S. 632 (1974).
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based on sex but because it burdened the fundamental right to procreate.102
Protecting women from pregnancy discrimination, thereby requiring that
their particular burden in reproduction be shared through insurance on the
same terms as other physical disabilities, helps ensure that the opportunity
to reproduce is not the price of participation in the public sphere of em-
ployment. Just as "extra" voting power would enable non-English-speak-
ing communities to receive the same public benefits as other communities,
"extra" protection against temporary disability enables women to both
reproduce and participate in the economy on terms similar to those avail-
able to the never-pregnant people for whom most state programs related to
employment are typically designed.' 03
Under either approach, the PDA may have a hard time passing the
Court's test of congruence and proportionality to constitutional violations.
With respect to proportionality, the advantage of a private cause of action
is that it is self-limiting. If the remedy is congruent to a constitutional
problem, then the burden imposed on the state will amount only to enforce-
ment of the remedy in individual instances. In terms of congruence, the
challenge is to move the PDA out of the "anti-Marbury" category. The
102. Id. at 639-40, 647-48. The Court objected to the use of a "conclusive presumption"
that a four-months pregnant teacher was incapacitated from doing her job. See id. at 644.
The Court acknowledged that gender stereotypes probably played a role in the formation of
the policy, but it did not find it necessary to rely on a pure sex discrimination analysis. See
id. at 641 n.9 (noting that several school board members thought the policy "justified in
order to insulate schoolchildren from the sight of conspicuously pregnant women"). Justice
Powell would have based the decision on the Equal Protection Clause because the policy
was based on archaic stereotypes. See id. at 653 (Powell, J., concurring).
103. For example, social security and unemployment compensation programs were
designed on the assumption that the typical beneficiary was a full-time male breadwinner
with dependent wife and children. Welfare was initially founded on the complementary
assumption that white women with small children could not or should not work outside the
home. See LINDA GORDON, PITIED BuT Nor ENTITLED: SINGLE MOTHERS AND THE HIS-
TORY OF WELFARE (1994) (especially chapter on "Prevention Before Charity: Social Insur-
ance and the Sexual Division of Labor"); see also Lisa A. Crooms, Don't Believe the Hype:
Black Women, Patriarchy and the New Welfarism, 38 HowARD L.J. 611, 620-24 (1995)
(describing changes in racial makeup of welfare recipients and changes in program's goals);
Barbara A. Mikulski & Ellyn L. Brown, Case Studies in the Treatment of Women Under
Social Security Law: The Need for Reform, 6 HARv. WOMEN'S L.J. 29 (1983) (describing
inequities in treatment of women depending on marital status); Mary F. Radford, Wimberly
and Beyond: Analyzing the Refusal to Award Unemployment Compensation to Women Who
Tenninate Prior Employment Due to Pregnancy, 63 N.Y.U. L. REv. 532 (1988) (critiquing
Supreme Court's holding that the federal ban on pregnancy discrimination in unemploy-
ment compensation did not require state to compensate a job-seeking woman who left her
job due to pregnancy); Elizabeth F. Thompson, Unemployment Compensation: Women and
Children-The Denials, 46 U. MiAmvn L. R v. 751 (1992) (critiquing states' refusal to rec-
ognize lack of child care as "good cause" when mothers seek unemployment
compensation).
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success of disparate impact rules under the direct South Carolina v. Kat-
zenbach rationale may depend on the Court's viewing them, because of
their modest scope and standards, as screening mechanisms that primarily
structure the burden of proof in litigation, rather than as mechanisms that
do away with the requirement of intentional discrimination. The PDA does
not fit this model: it bans particular practices already held to be constitu-
tional; it affects benefits plans as well as actual employment decisions; and
it lacks a factual record demonstrating the use of pregnancy discrimination
as a mask for what the Court considers sex discrimination. The indirect
"preservation of fundamental rights" argument depends on the Court's
willingness to see at least a potential state infringement on the right to
procreate in the structure of an employee benefit plan. The right to
reproduce is protected against "undue" state interference, which may jus-
tify giving women a statutory right to "extra" benefits because of their
greater biological burden. The fundamental problem illustrated by this ap-
proach to justifying the PDA is that, because "neutral" state actions will
always satisfy the Equal Protection Clause, sexual inequality that turns on a
sexual difference must also involve something independently protected by
the Constitution in order for Congress to respond under Section 5.
IV. Enforcing the Citizenship Clause
The difference between women and men with regard to pregnancy is
related to other sex differences, including different genitals and differences
in size and build. Just as women's ability to become pregnant is culturally
transformed into their responsibility for most child care, their smaller size
is exaggerated. Norms of behavior and attractiveness produce a society in
which "husbands are overwhelmingly bigger [and] stronger than wives."'"
On top of women's frequent physical disadvantage, violence against them
is culturally legitimized. Domestic violence affects not just its direct vic-
tims but also those who live under its threat, and those who are grateful to
husbands who refrain from using the level of violence considered nor-
mal.' °5 Under prevailing cultural norms, vulnerability to physical abuse,
104. ROBIN WEST, PROGRESSIVE CONSTrrUnoNALIsM: RECONSTRUCTING THE FOUR-
TEENTH AMENDMENT 62 (1994); see also JANE SMILEY, ORDINARY LOVE AND GOOD WILL
54-55 (1989) ("I would like that. ... falling in love with someone in the seventh grade, and
then having her grow up pretty, and shorter than me, and smart, and funny, too.").
105. See LILLIAN RUBIN, WORLDS OF PAIN: Lni IN THE WORKING CLASS FAMILY 93
(1976) (finding that the typical response when subjects were asked what they valued in their
husbands was, "'He's a steady worker; he doesn't drink; he doesn't hit me'") (quoting a
thirty-three year old housewife); see also ARLIE HOCHSCHILD WITH ANNE MACHUNG, THE
SECOND SHFT: WORKING PARENTS AND THE REVOLUTION AT HOME 18 (1989) (describing
how "economies of gratitude" between spouses depend on what each spouse considers
typical).
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along with other aspects of control that come with it, is the price many
women pay for sexual intimacy and a family. This loss of freedom and
autonomy, occurring through women's intimate relationships, is an impor-
tant feature of women's inequality-their subordination to men one-at-a-
time as well as collectively.
Some see women's vulnerability to rape as similar to their vulnerabil-
ity due to smaller size, a burden imposed by nature and the difference that
provided the first step towards subordination to men. 10 6 Others point out
the danger of assuming that sexual domination is natural. For example,
Professor Catharine MacKinnon notes of women's experiences with por-
nography, "Because this treatment is done almost exclusively to women, it
is implicitly treated as a difference, the sex difference, when in fact it is the
socially situated subjection of women."'0 7 While it is sometimes difficult
to identify the line between "biology [and] the social consequences of biol-
ogy,"'l s the result is that because of women's vulnerability to rape, the
sexes are differently situated in a way that the Supreme Court has recog-
106. See Susan Brownmiller, Rape, in Issuns IN FEmNSM: AN INTRODUCTION TO WO-
MEN'S STums 176, 177 (Sheila Ruth ed., 1990) ("From the humblest beginnings of the
social order based on a primitive system of retaliatory force-the lex talionis: an eye for an
eye-woman was unequal before the law. By anatomical fiat ... the human male was a
natural predator and the human female served as his natural prey. Where could be no
retaliation in kind.").
107. MAcKNNON, FEMnISM, supra note 79, at 41. The danger of what Professor MacK-
innon warns against is illustrated by comments distinguishing "real" hate crimes from the
forms of violence most often experienced by women. For example:
[Collective violence] is quite unlike private violence, for example, domestic vio-
lence or street violence, in which the victims are selected by the attacker because
of some relationship the attacker has to the victim or because of something about
the victim that makes him or her a desirable target, such as having money or being
a woman (rape).
John Ladd, The Idea of Collective Violence, in JUSTICE, LAW AND VIOLENCE 19 (1991),
quoted in David Frazee, An Imperfect Remedy for Imperfect Violence: The Construction of
Civil Rights in the Violence Against Women Act, 1 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 163, 202 (1993);
cf Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (discussed supra note 100). For an opposite analy-
sis of rape that makes the same mistake, consider this comment offered by the Justice De-
partment, in opposition to the civil rights provision of the Violence Against Women Act:
[We] are concerned that the premise of the bill is that all rapes are gender-bias
crimes, a premise that we cannot accept and one we believe is unsupported by...
the common belief among psychologists and others who have studied rapists that
the principal motivation is a desire for control and power, rather than a hatred of
women.
Letter from Bruce Navarro, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, U.S. Department of Justice,
to Senator Joseph Biden, Chair of the Committee on the Judiciary, quoted in Brande Stel-
lings, The Public Harm of Private Violence: Rape, Sex Discrimination and Citizenship, 28
HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 185, 187 n.5 (1993).
108. See LAURENCE H. TRIE, AmmICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1585 (2d ed. 1988).
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nized and treated as a natural sex difference rather than a problem of
inequality. 10 9
Rape and family violence were among Congress's principal concerns
when it passed the Violence Against Women Act. VAWA includes a vari-
ety of measures to combat violence against women, including grants for
programs ranging from safety improvements in public transportation to the
education of judges about domestic violence. 110 The most legally contro-
versial provision is the civil rights remedy, which creates a right "to be free
from crimes of violence motivated by gender." ' By calling this statute a
civil rights law, Congress indicated its view that such crimes reflect and
maintain inequality rather than natural difference. Until recently, this pro-
vision was upheld by the federal courts as an exercise of Congress's com-
merce power.' 1 2 But when a panel of the Fourth Circuit so held, the en
banc court reheard the case and struck down VAWA's civil rights rem-
edy.'1 3 In doing so, the court rejected not only the Commerce Clause ra-
tionale 14 but also the alternative rationale offered by Congress and several
109. See Michael M. v. Superior Court, 450 U.S. 464 (1981) (discussed supra note 100);
Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977) (discussed supra note 100).
110. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 13931, 13991 (1998).
111. 42 U.S.C. § 13981 (1998).
112. See Liu v. Striulu, 36 F. Supp. 2d 452 (D.R.I. 1999); Mattison v. Click Corp. of
America, Inc., No. 97-CV-2736, 1998 WL 32597 at *5-*6 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 27, 1998); Ziegler
v. Ziegler, 28 F. Supp. 2d 601 (E.D. Wash. 1998); Anisimov v. Lake, 982 F. Supp. 531
(N.D. 111. 1997); Crisonino v. New York City Housing Auth., 985 F. Supp. 385 (S.D.N.Y.
1997); Seaton v. Seaton, 971 F. Supp. 1188 (E.D. Tenn. 1997); Doe v. Hartz, 970 F. Supp.
1375 (N.D. Iowa 1997), rev'd on other grounds, 134 F.3d 1339 (8th Cir. 1998); Doe v. Doe,
929 F. Supp. 608 (D. Conn. 1996). For commentary arguing in favor of a Commerce
Clause justification for VAWA, see Kerrie E. Maloney, Gender-Motivated Violence and the
Commerce Clause: The Civil Rights Provision of the Violence Against Women Act After
Lopez, 96 COLUM. L. REv. 1876 (1996); Carolyn Peri Weiss, Title III of the Violence
Against Women Act: Constitutionally Safe and Sound, 75 WASH. U.L.Q. 723 (1997). For
the opposing view, see Derek A. Kurtz, Does the Violence Against Women Act Do Violence
to the Limits of Congressional Power?, 34 SAN DIEGo L. REv. 1047 (1997); Lisa A. Car-
roll, Women's Powerless Tool: How Congress Overreached the Constitution with the Civil
Rights Remedy of the Violence Against Women Act, 30 J. MARSHALL L. REv. 803, 806
(1997); Mary C. Carty, Doe v. Doe and the Violence Against Women Act: A Post-Lopez,
Commerce Clause Analysis, 71 ST. JoHN's L. REv. 465 (1997).
113. See Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic & State Univ., 169 F.3d 820 (4th Cir. 1999)
(en banc), cert. granted, - S. Ct. - (1999).
114. See id. at. 826-36. The court first held that under Lopez the Commerce Clause does
not authorize federal legislation of non-commercial activity unless the statute contains a
jurisdictional element, regardless of the effect the regulated activity has on interstate or
foreign commerce. See id. at 826-27 (interpreting United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549
(1995)). This is a plausible but not necessary reading of Lopez.
In the alternative, the Brzonkala court considered the possibility that Congress may
regulate non-commercial activity but insisted that there must be some judicially enforceable
stopping point. See Brzonkala, 169 F.3d at 826. In addition to expressing its concern that
[Vol. 8:51
Women and the Promise of Equal Citizenship
commentators, that VAWA enforces the Equal Protection Clause. 11 5 In
Part V, I argue that VAWA should instead be understood as enforcing the
Citizenship Clause. To develop an approach to the Citizenship Clause, in
this Part I explore a hypothetical law, similar to VAWA, that Congress
might have enacted.
Another step Congress might have taken toward its goal that "crimes
against women [not] be lessened, diminished, and dismissed because of the
relationships that [spawn] them '11' 6 would have been to abolish marital
rape exemptions' 17 and interspousal tort immunity" 8 in those states where
upholding VAWA would "emasculate the judicial role," the court held that VAWA went
beyond any stopping point in part because it intruded on realms of traditional state author-
ity: criminal law and domestic relations. See id. at 840-43, 858-59. This argument reso-
nates with the political objections to other provisions of VAWA, but it is something of a
stretch given that the provision at issue in Brzonkala was a civil rights remedy that neither
defined nor hinged on family relationships. More importantly, the majority failed to re-
spond effectively to the appellants' most intriguing argument, which was that any special
interest the states have in crime and domestic relations is outweighed by the special federal
interest in civil rights. See id. at 852-54. The court treated this argument as if the appel-
lants were asserting the power to legislate on civil rights as an independent basis of federal
authority. See id. at 854 ("[W]e respect the concerns underlying appellants' argument that
Congress has a general power to pass 'civil rights' statutes."). Yet, it is the court that
introduced the idea that certain fields of law belong to a particular level of government in a
way that is relevant to a Commerce Clause analysis.
The dissenting opinion took the position that limitations on Congress's commerce
power should be enforced primarily through the political process. See id. at 925-26 (Motz,
J., dissenting); see also supra note 67 (discussing the relative roles of the courts and Con-
gress in setting the boundary between state and federal power).
115. See id. at 861-89. For commentary discussing the equal protection rationale for
VAWA, see Danielle M. Houck, VAWA After Lopez: Reconsidering Congressional Power
Under the Fourteenth Amendment in Light of Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic and State
University, 31 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 625 (1998); Chris A. Rauschl, Brzonkala v. Virginia
Polytechnic and State University: Violence Against Women, Commerce, and the Fourteenth
Amendment-Defining Constitutional Limits, 81 MIN. L. REv. 1601 (1997); Lori L.
Schick, Breaking the "Rule of Thumb" and Opening the Curtains-Can the Violence
Against Women Act Survive Constitutional Scrutiny?, 28 U. TOL. L. REv. 887 (1997); but
see Carroll, supra note 112; Kurtz, supra note 112. All of these articles discuss VAWA as a
measure to enforce the Equal Protection Clause. The first, by Danielle Houck, was written
after the Supreme Court's decision in City of Boerne, but it relies on the Morgan description
of the scope of congressional power, discussing City of Boerne only in a footnote.
116. Victoria F. Nourse, Where Violence, Relationship, and Equality Meet: The Violence
Against Women Act's Civil Rights Remedy, 11 Wis. WomEN's L.J. 1, 2 (1996).
117. See Model Penal Code § 213.1 (1997). A typical modem definition of rape incor-
porates a marital exemption. The Model Penal Code defines rape as a crime committed by
a male against "a female not his wife." Id. In no state is marital rape completely immune
from prosecution, but many states limit prosecutions by, for example, requiring aggravated
force, treating marital rape as a misdemeanor, or allowing cohabitation as an affirmative
defense to rape. See Lisa R. Eskow, The Ultimate Weapon?: Demythologizing Spousal
Rape and Reconceptualizing Its Prosecution, 48 STAN. L. REv. 677, 681-83 (1996)
(describing range of state laws covering marital rape); see also Lalenya Weintraub Siegel,
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they still exist. Though a smaller step, this would be a more direct intru-
sion into state affairs. 119 Assuming that these immunities would not be
struck down under current equal protection doctrine, the remainder of this
Part discusses Congress's power to abolish them in order to enforce the
Citizenship Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. I argue that despite the
formal sex neutrality that allows immunity doctrines to evade the Equal
Protection Clause,' 2° these doctrines are clear continuations of the legal
relegation of wives to second-class citizenship. Their role in preserving
inequality entitles Congress to abolish them despite their modem, neutral
form.
The Marital Rape Exemption: Evolution to Extinction, 43 CLEV. ST. L. Rnv. 351 (1995)
(arguing that equality between women and men cannot exist until martial rape exemptions
are abolished); Jaye Sitton, Old Wine in New Bottles: The "Marital" Rape Allowance, 72
N.C. L. REv. 261, 271-73 (1993) (arguing that marital rape exemptions create involuntary
servitude in violation of Thirteenth Amendment).
118. When wives were subsumed under their husbands' identities upon marriage, an in-
terspousal tort action was a legal impossibility-the husband would have been both plaintiff
and defendant. See Rhonda L. Kohler, The Battered Woman and Tort Law: A New Ap-
proach to Fighting Domestic Violence, 25 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 1025, 1038 (1996); Carl To-
bias, Interspousal Tort Immunity in America, 23 GA. L. Rv. 359, 364, 385 (1989). After
the doctrine of coverture was abandoned, courts developed the doctrine of spousal immu-
nity for torts, asserting that it would promote marital harmony and prevent fraud. See
Kohler at 1039; Tobias at 389-91, 449. In this century, some states have rejected these
arguments and abolished spousal tort immunity, either by statute or by judicial decision.
See Reva B. Siegel, "The Rule of Love": Wife Beating as Prerogative and Privacy, 105
YALE L.J. 2117, 2163 n.163 (1996) [hereinafter R. Siegel]; Kohler at 1049; Tobias at 422-
41 (discussing developments in the period from 1921 to 1989). A few, however, have re-
affirmed it. See R. Siegel at 2163 n.163; Kohler at 1049; Tobias at 422-41; see also R.
Siegel at 2193 n.272 (summarizing cases involving constitutional challenges to interspousal
tort immunity).
119. Congress's power to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment's prohibitions necessarily
includes some power to intrude on state affairs. However, contrary to the Fourth Circuit's
argument in Brzonkala, there is nothing wrong with Congress seeking to minimize the intru-
sion, the degree of which may affect a court's analysis of whether Congress's remedy is
"proportional" under City of Boerne. Compare Brzonkala, 169 F.3d at 875-76 (dismissing
the government's argument that VAWA regulates private action so as to avoid intruding on
state sovereignty by claiming that this argument "confuses the Fourteenth Amendment with
the Commerce Clause and other similar grants of federal power") with id. at 872-73 (argu-
ing that VAWA's civil rights remedy is too broad because it does not recognize interspousal
tort immunity or the marital rape exemption).
120. Doctrines of interspousal tort immunity are, obviously, phrased in sex-neutral terms.
Some rape statutes, such as the Model Penal Code version, are sex-specific, so that any sex
crime committed by a woman or against a man is classified separately, as sodomy or sexual
assault. However, these statutes are always sex-symmetric in privileging assaults on a
spouse. They could be challenged as illegitimate classifications based on marital status.
However, as noted in the previous footnotes, several states have revised the doctrines to
cover all co-habitants and to exclude married couples living apart.
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The Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments built on what was begun
with the Thirteenth. In terms of direct political participation, one aspect of
citizenship, the Thirteenth Amendment promised nothing explicitly, the
Fourteenth tried to encourage the states to extend the franchise,"' and the
Fifteenth directly forbade race discrimination in elections. Section 1 of the
Fourteenth Amendment extended the Thirteenth Amendment's abolition of
slavery to more general principles of equal status and treatment.
Under slavery, racial subjugation by law was accomplished primarily
in the private sphere. Slaves were considered part of a plantation "family,"
to be governed primarily by the male head of the owning family.122 There
was little or no additional privacy for slave families. 123 Extreme abuse
could lead to government or community intervention, but, for the most
part, violence and the threat of violence were the right of the slave owners
to use.12 4 In Professor Robin West's formulation, the slave was subject to
two sovereigns: the general government and the owner, "the commands of
both to be endured under the threat of unchecked violence." 1
The Thirteenth Amendment abolished the primary legal institution for
making racial subjugation a private affair. Other mechanisms helped for-
mer slave owners maintain their private domination over former slaves.
State legislatures tied former slaves to particular employers, maintaining
personal, "family" relationships.' 26 Well into this century, a large propor-
tion of black women worked as live-in maids, a job particularly known for
its personally exploitative potential.' 27 State law enforcement denied pro-
tection, keeping intact the "threat of unchecked violence" that had made
121. See U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 2. Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment tied
each state's representation in the House of Representatives (and therefore the Electoral Col-
lege) to the proportion of adult males in the state who were permitted to vote in national and
state elections.
122. See EUGENE D. GENOVESE, ROLL, JORDAN, ROLL: THE WORLD THE SLAVES MADE 4
(1974); CAROLE PATEMAN, THE SEXUAL CoNTRACT 122 (1988); DAVID A.J. RIcIARDs,
CONSCIENCE AND THE CONsTrrTION: HISTORY, THEORY, AND LAW OF THE RECONSTRUC-
TION AMENDMENTS 227 (1993).
123. See PATRICIA HILL COLLINS, BLACK FEMINIST THOUGHT: KNOWLEDGE, CONSCIOUS-
NESS, AND THE POLITICS OF EMoWmuvmNT 48-49 (1990).
124. See GENOVESE, supra note 122, at 36-38, 41-43 (discussing legal and community
responses to brutality).
125. WEST, supra note 104, at 23; see generally GENOVESE, supra note 122, at 25-49
(discussing legal regulation of relations between blacks and whites under slavery).
126. See Margaret Burnham, Property, Parenthood, and Peonage: Reflections on the
Return to Status Quo Antebellum, 18 CARDozo L. REV. 433, 435-36 (1996).
127. See COLLINS, supra note 123, at 53-56, 176 (noting that "urbanization meant migra-
tion out of agricultural work and into domestic work," which was "more profoundly ex-
ploitative than other comparable occupations [because of] the personal relationship between
employer and employee" and subjected the employee to frequent sexual harassment).
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whites sovereign under slavery. 128 The Fourteenth Amendment attempted
to improve this situation, recognizing that merely abolishing the particular
institution of slavery had not abolished all aspects of racial subjugation.
129
It abolished the legal basis for practices of subordination that underlay both
slavery and its post-war continuations, which subjected one group to the
sovereignty of another and denied the subordinate group equal and fair
protection from the general government.
130
Another way to fight the post-war continuations of slavery, using only
the Thirteenth Amendment, is the "badges-and-incidents" doctrine. Con-
gress has used its Thirteenth Amendment enforcement power to pass laws
banning race discrimination in several private contexts, including bias
crimes and contract formation.131 The Supreme Court has upheld these
laws because, even though they do not directly outlaw slavery, they are
aimed at what Congress believes to be the badges and incidents of slav-
ery.' 32 When Congress passes a law to enforce the Thirteenth Amend-
ment, the courts review it according to an idea of what slavery is and what
is required to achieve its opposite, freedom. In other words, the badges-
and-incidents doctrine is the Thirteenth Amendment version of the preser-
vative rationale from Katzenbach v. Morgan. It allows Congress to create
statutory rights in order to protect and preserve a constitutional value.
Just as the Fourteenth Amendment's Citizenship Clause was an exten-
sion of the Thirteenth Amendment's abolition of slavery, Congress's Four-
teenth Amendment enforcement power makes more sense if there is
something substantive to enforce in the Citizenship Clause, something sim-
128. See WEST, supra note 104, at 23-25 (citing JACOBUS TENBROEK, THE ANTISLAVERY
ORIGINS OF THE FouRtmEim A mENnr~r 116-344 (1951)).
129. See The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 70 (1873) (stating that Congress con-
cluded that the Fourteenth Amendment was needed because, "notwithstanding the formal
recognition by those States of the abolition of slavery, the condition of the slave race would,
without further protection of the Federal government, be almost as bad as it was before");
Robert J. Kaczorowski, Revolutionary Constitutionalism in the Era of the Civil War and
Reconstruction, 61 N.Y.U. L. REv. 863, 910-13 (1986); TENBROEK, supra note 128, at 184.
130. See WEST, supra note 104, at 25 ("[The formal abolition of slavery will not neces-
sarily guarantee the sole sovereignty of the state, and hence the true 'citizen's equality,'
promised by the phrase 'equal protection of the laws.' Thus, the need for yet another
amendment.").
131. See Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 104-05 (1971) (holding that Thirteenth
Amendment empowers Congress to criminalize racially motivated interference with an-
other's constitutional rights); Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 437-44 (1968)
(holding that Thirteenth Amendment empowers Congress to prohibit all racial discrimina-
tion in the sale or lease of real property).
132. See Jones, 392 U.S. at 439 (stating that Enabling Clause of Thirteenth Amendment
"clothed 'Congress with power to pass all laws necessary and proper for abolishing all
badges and incidents of slavery in the United States"' (quoting Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S.
3, 20 (1883))).
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ilar to the badges-and-incidents doctrine of the Thirteenth Amendment. As
the subtle distinctions in Morgan, South Carolina v. Katzenbach, and City
of Boerne demonstrate, opportunities for Congress to contribute to enforc-
ing the "No state shall" provisions-which can be enforced in court, and
which Congress is forbidden to expand-are few.133 On the other hand,
there is a necessary similarity between "the kind of values protected by the
Fourteenth Amendment's ideal of equal citizenship and the Thirteenth
Amendment's freedom component." '134 Both protect against class-based
disabilities, "the degradation of stigmatization, [which] makes an individ-
ual unworthy to be treated as a person, and hence, as a citizen." '135 If the
Citizenship Clause imparts something more than "the privilege of writing
'citizen' after your name,"' 36 then that something must be similar to what
is conferred by the Thirteenth Amendment, which abolished a particular
institution of subordination and empowered Congress to weed out its
remnants.
Suppose that rather than explicitly abolishing slavery in the Thirteenth
Amendment, the nation had proceeded directly to the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. Surely, the Citizenship and Equal Protection Clauses would have
been sufficient to outlaw slavery. Furthermore, there is no reason why
Congress's power to outlaw the badges and incidents of slavery would not
have been as broad.' 37 This is not to say that the Thirteenth Amendment
has no role to play in the Constitution, only that it is a role that might have
been played by the language of the Fourteenth, read with the understanding
that abolishing slavery was its most immediate object.
Until the twentieth century, the law recognized and endorsed the sub-
ordination of women to men in marriage. The dismantling of that system
has been much more gradual than was the abolition of slavery; it is first
133. See Frantz, supra note 63, at 1356 (noting that state action limitation on most of
Section 1 "pulls inevitably toward producing an amendment which confers new power pri-
marily on the federal judiciary"); Samuel Estreicher, Congressional Power and Congres-
sional Rights: Reflections on Proposed "Human Life" Legislation, 68 VA. L. REv. 333,
421-22, n.294 (1982) (arguing that overly narrow interpretations of Section 5 produce "ex-
travagant" uses of commerce power to address equality issues).
134. Charles H. Jones, Jr., An Argument for Federal Protection Against Racially Moti-
vated Crimes: 18 U.S.C. § 241 and the Thirteenth Amendment, 21 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv.
689, 731 (1986) [hereinafter Jones, An Argument for Federal Protection].
135. Jones, An Argument for Federal Protection, supra note 134, at 732.
136. BLACK, STRucTuRE AND RELATIONSHmP, supra note 7, at 62. The Court has recog-
nized that citizenship status involves certain obligations, the scope of which can be defined
by the legislature. See e.g., Kennedy v. Medoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144 (1963) (national
citizen's duty to render military service); Miller Bros. v. Maryland, 347 U.S. 964 (1954)
(state citizen's duty to pay taxes).
137. See Kaczorowski, supra note 129, at 913 (stating that the Citizenship Clause em-
powered Congress "to enforce the status and rights of citizenship").
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recognizable in the Married Women's Property Acts that began to appear
in the 1840s. As these early moves towards formal equality began, courts
developed principles of marital privacy, used to justify interspousal immu-
nity and marital rape exemptions, which shielded the perpetuation of pri-
vate hierarchy.138 While after the abolition of slavery race relations slowly
moved to the public spheres of politics and the economy, relations between
the sexes as such remained centered in the private sphere of the home and
family. The meaning of this privacy for whites was reflected in their reluc-
tance to apply it to black families: some states developed an interest in
wife-beating, selectively enforced against black men not out of solicitude
for black women but "to prevent [their] recently emancipated husband[s]
from asserting the 'privileges' of a master." '139 Few people want to abolish
"the family" as an institution, but women's equal citizenship depends upon
abolishing the remnants of legal hierarchy between wives and husbands-a
kind of second-class citizenship implicitly forbidden by the Citizenship
Clause.
Accepting that the Citizenship Clause may be given substantive con-
tent would not mean that Congress would be free to create any statutory
rights it pleased as long as it declared them to be crucial to citizenship. In
its modem cases in the Thirteenth Amendment context, beginning with
Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 4 ' the Supreme Court has shown Congress
great but not unbounded deference in defining the concept of slavery and in
reaching out to abolish its badges and incidents. Jones may be the Morgan
of the Thirteenth Amendment;14 1 it is safe to assume that a stricter standard
along the lines of City of Boerne will be applied in the future to Thirteenth
Amendment legislation, as well as to Citizenship Clause legislation if such
a category emerges. However, it seems improbable that the Court would
entirely eliminate Congress's power to take the lead in defining and abol-
ishing the badges and incidents of slavery. Doing so would mean forsak-
138. See R. Siegel, supra note 118, at 2206 (arguing that rhetorical shifts from explicit
invocations of natural hierarchy to privacy and, recently, to federalism provide historically
appropriate justifications for continuing patterns of racial and sexual subordination).
139. R. Siegel, supra note 118, at 2135. At the same time in history, white married
women were slowly becoming less encumbered by legal disabilities, but judicial enthusiasm
for the sanctity of marital privacy effectively sheltered their continued dominance by their
husbands. See id. at 2120. In addition to failing to recognize black families' privacy in the
sense of allowing the husband to dominate, southern courts denied the sanctity of the par-
ent-child bond in black families by sanctioning an apprenticeship system that separated
thousands of black children from their families. See Burnham, supra note 126, at 436.
140. 392 U.S. 409 (1968) (holding that Congress has power under the Thirteenth Amend-
ment to outlaw race discrimination in the purchase and sale of property); see also Runyon v.
McCrary, 427 U.S. 160 (1976) (relying on the expansive standard in Jones); Griffin v.
Breckenridge, 304 U.S. 88 (1971) (same).
141. See TRIBE, supra note 108, at 332.
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ing the badges-and-incidents concept beyond the context in which the
courts would be willing to hold that people acting in their private capacities
could commit constitutional violations. Even under increased judicial scru-
tiny, Congress would retain the power to develop the meaning of freedom
under the Thirteenth Amendment and the meaning of citizenship under the
Fourteenth.
As a starting point, then, one must have a theory of what citizenship
is, what dangers threaten it, and what remedies are "congruent" to those
dangers. One notion of citizenship is linked to the idea of a social contract,
in which "liberty" is understood as the absence of governmental restraint.
In this model, one becomes a citizen by voluntarily ceding a portion of pre-
existing freedom to democratically legitimate constraints. Feminists have
argued that this notion of citizenship is inadequate once the family, and
women's place in it, is taken into account. 42 As an alternative, Professor
Tracy Higgins has outlined a feminist theory of citizenship in which free-
dom is created, rather than preserved, through democracy.' 43 Under this
theory, "equality cannot be equated with state neutrality but must be evalu-
ated against substantive conditions produced by both public and private
power."'" When the conditions produced by private social allocations of
power tend to subordinate women, Congress must be able to provide for
women's full citizenship by creating ways to redress private imbalances.
The concept of freedom as something sought and created through gov-
ernment rather than pre-existing it is not entirely alien to our law. Our
founding document indicates that even though the basic human rights of
"Life, Liberty, and the Pursuit of Happiness" are "unalienable," govern-
ments must be instituted "to secure these Rights."'145 Similar language ap-
pears in the preamble to the Constitution. 4 6 The need for freedom to be
142. See, e.g., Higgins, supra note 5, at 1676; CATHARwE A. MAcKINNON, TOWARD A
FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE 215-34 (1989) [hereinafter MAcKINNON, THEORY OF THE
STATE]. For some particular applications, see Tracy E. Higgins, Anti-Essentialism, Relativ-
ism, and Human Rights, 19 HARv. WOMEN's L.J. 89, 101 (1996); Leslie Gielow Jacobs,
Adding Complexity to Confusion and Seeing the Light: Feminist Legal Insights and the
Jurisprudence of the Religion Clauses, 7 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 137, 152 (1995); Martha
Chamallas, Consent, Equality, and the Legal Control of Sexual Conduct, 61 S. CAL. L. REv.
777, 782-83 (1988).
143. See Higgins, supra note 5.
144. Higgins, supra note 5, at 1698.
145. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
146. See U.S. CONST. preamble. The preamble states:
We the people of the United States, in Order to form a more perfect Union, estab-
lish Justice, insure domestic Tranquility, provide for the common defense, pro-
mote the general Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and
our Posterity, do ordain and establish this Constitution for the United States of
America.
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affirmatively secured was especially apparent during the post-Civil War
period that gave rise to the Fourteenth Amendment. Dissenting in the Civil
Rights Cases, 4 7 Justice Harlan considered the question of what "positive
rights and privileges were intended to be secured, and are in fact secured
by the Fourteenth Amendment." '148 While the majority ignored the first
sentence of Section 1, declaring the entire section to be "prohibitory upon
the states,"149 Justice Harlan pointed out that Congress is empowered "to
enforce 'the provisions of this article' ... ; not simply those of a prohibi-
tive character, but [all] of the provisions-affirmative and prohibitive."' 50
But what was secured to colored citizens of the United States-
as between them and their respective states-by the grant to
them of state citizenship? With what rights, privileges, or immu-
nities did this grant from the nation invest them? There is one, if
there be no others-exemption from race discrimination in re-
spect of any civil right belonging to citizens of the white race in
the same state.1
5 1
Although Justice Harlan refers to rights "as between them and their respec-
tive states," he is arguing here for the constitutionality of a federal law
banning private race discrimination in public accommodations.'5 2 The last
phrase of the quotation refers to the Privileges and Immunities Clause of
Article IV, Section 2, understood, as in Corfield v. Coryell,153 as guaran-
teeing not just equal treatment of out-of-state visitors but basic liberties
"which belong, of right, to the citizens of all free governments."' 54 Justice
Harlan thus treats the Fourteenth Amendment's grant of state citizenship as
providing Congress "a constitutional basis for guaranteeing to all state citi-
zens an equal right to common law protections," including the right to non-
discriminatory treatment.' At least where the state's laws do not protect
this right, Congress is empowered to provide a remedy. Linking Con-
gress's ability to guarantee equal treatment to the adequacy of the states'
laws, Professor Laurence Tribe explains that the Civil Rights Cases were
"an ideal vehicle for demonstrating both proper and improper applications
of the Civil Rights Act," because "in one of the cases before the Court but
Id.
147. 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
148. Id. at 44 (Harlan, J., dissenting). For further critique of the majority decision, see
McGoldrick, supra note 63.
149. Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 21.
150. Id. at 47 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
151. Id. at 48 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
152. Id. at 26-27 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (summarizing the statute).
153. 4 Wash. C.C. 371, 6 F. Cas. 546 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823).
154. 6 F. Cas. at 551.
155. TRIBE, supra note 108, at 1695 n.16.
[Vol. 8:51
Women and the Promise of Equal Citizenship
not the others, a state (Tennessee) had specifically repealed its common
law rule of equal access."' 56
Applying an affirmative, freedom-seeking conception of citizenship to
abrogation of legal immunity for husbands who beat and rape their wives,
Congress could acknowledge that states have policy reasons for these doc-
trines but express its concern that they permit private domination, the inter-
vention of another sovereign over one of the nation's citizens. Because
this is not an isolated possibility but a traditional and widespread form of
oppression, Congress may decide that the other policy considerations must
yield. In doing so, Congress would be abrogating traditional rules rather
than protecting a traditional common law right like the right to nondiscrim-
inatory treatment cited by Justice Harlan.'57 However, this difference does
not matter because the relevant common law for deciding the rights of
citizenship is that which governs between equals, not doctrines rooted in
the notion of coverture, the legal disappearance of a woman upon marriage.
One cannot rebut Justice Harlan's argument by digging up common law
rules governing the relationship between master and slave. In the Civil
Rights Cases, states like Tennessee had to alter their common law to make
up for the abolition of slavery by explicitly repealing the rule of equal
access. While the continued existence of the family as a status relationship
smoothed the transition from codified to permissive hierarchy, this fact
should not make a constitutional difference.
The incompatibility between private subordination and a person's sta-
tus as a full member of the political community was noted by a state court
that decided, in light of the Nineteenth Amendment, that interspousal tort
immunity should be abandoned.' 5 8 The court reasoned: "Wives are no
longer chattels. There are half a million women voters in North Carolina.
They do not need to beg for protection for their persons, their property, or
their characters. They can command it."' 59 The court did not think it nec-
essary that women actually "command it" by using their new political
power to lobby for the abolition of tort immunity. Women's new status as
voters, as full members of the community of citizens, was sufficient to
make inappropriate a legal scheme in which they must "beg for protection"
rather than claim it as a matter of right.
156. Id.
157. See supra notes 117-18 (discussing coverture, interspousal tort immunity, and the
marital rape exemption).
158. See Crowell v. Crowell, 105 S.E. 206 (N.C. 1920).
159. Id. at 210, quoted in Tobias, supra note 117, at 471. Professor Higgins notes, "The
idea that voting was central to citizenship, and even personhood, can be traced to Aristotle."
Higgins, supra note 5, at 1683 n.128 (citing ARISTOTLE, TiH POLTCS 87 (Carnes Lord
trans. 1984) and JuDrrH N. SHK.LAR, AMmaCAN CrrizENsmp 3 (1991)).
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V. The Violence Against Women Act as a Promise of Equal
Citizenship
Congress has not chosen to abrogate state tort rules but instead, in the
Violence Against Women Act, to create a right to be free of violence moti-
vated by gender animus. The cause of action that enforces this right gives
rise to two related problems: first, under what theory is it a constitutional
exercise of Congress's Section 5 powers; second, what does "animus"
based on gender mean? This Part considers two possible answers to these
questions. The first is a categorical approach, under which all victims of
sex crimes would be entitled to the civil rights remedy. I discuss this an-
swer to the "animus" question as a Morgan-like enforcement of the Equal
Protection Clause. The second answer is the one chosen by Congress,
which rejected the categorical approach and instead made liability turn in
all cases on whether the violence was gender-motivated. I argue that this
remedy is better understood as a measure to enforce the Citizenship Clause.
A. State Action and Categorically Gender-Motivated Crimes
Congress considered writing into VAWA a rebuttable presumption
that all rapes and sexual assaults are gender-motivated. 160 This presump-
tion would have reflected the facts that women are overwhelmingly the
victims of such crimes, that sexual assault inherently is related to sex, and
that Congress had cause to be concerned about shortcomings in state en-
forcement of sex-crimes laws. Such a categorical approach to violence
against women would have made the parallel between VAWA and the pre-
servative equal protection rationale of Morgan as strong as possible."16 In-
stead of emphasizing its concern for the gender-based criminal motives of
private violators, Congress could have emphasized its concern for state dis-
crimination against women that takes the form of failing to enforce sex-
crimes laws or subjecting complainants to "double victimization" in the
process of prosecution.' 62 A federal civil rights remedy helps insulate vic-
tims of these crimes from state discrimination in three ways: it creates an
160. See Nourse, supra note 116, at 26; Carroll, supra note 112, at 819 (citing Crimes of
Violence Motivated by Gender: Hearing on H.R. 1133 Before the Subcomm. on Civil and
Constitutional Rights of the House Comm'n on the Judiciary, 103d Cong. 101 (1993) (state-
ment of Sally Goldfarb)).
161. This approach could be extended to include domestic violence cases. Under a cate-
gorical approach that seeks to redress state failures of law enforcement, extension to cover
domestic violence would be as easy (or hard) to justify as categorical coverage of sex
crimes. In terms of promoting women's equality, as opposed to providing equal protection
to the victims of crimes historically neglected by law enforcement, the domestic violence
category would probably be more over-inclusive than sex crimes.
162. S. Rm,. No. 102-97, at 39 (1991). For a detailed summary of shortcomings in
states' responses to sex-related crimes, see Schick, supra note 115, at 894-95, 924-28.
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additional deterrent against sex crime, making up for the states' failure to
deter; it gives the victim more control over the proceedings; and it gives
access to the federal courts, which have a special role in the protection of
civil rights and may be less biased against women.'63
If Congress is concerned that sex crimes are not adequately handled
by the states, a federal statutory right enforced through a private cause of
action against perpetrators is a plausible remedy. It is certainly less of an
intrusion on the states than direct interference in the form of mandates on
how to handle the cases, which would be "a most cumbersome way of
operating."'" Although a private suit against the offender does not create
incentives for the state's criminal system to improve, it provides redress
and protection for the victim, which is, after all, part of the reason for
wanting to improve the state's behavior in the first place.
Applying City of Boerne's "congruence and proportionality" test,
which the Fourth Circuit interpreted to require Congress's remedy to be "a
closely tailored means"' 65 of correcting violations of the Equal Protection
Clause, the Brzonkala decision rejected these arguments. In arguing that
VAWA lacks "congruence" to any constitutional violations, the court em-
phasized the state action doctrine'66 and said the legislative history of
VAWA did not demonstrate sufficient evidence of intentional discrimina-
tion by the states.' 67 Despite its position that Congress should direct Sec-
163. See Johanna R. Shargel, In Defense of the Civil Rights Remedy of the Violence
Against Women Act, 106 YALE L.J. 1849, 1882 n.181 (1997) (citing results of Ninth Circuit
study finding that "the federal courts are relatively free of the kind of blatant sexism [wo-
men] have encountered in some state courts"); see also Linda G. Mills, Intuition and In-
sight: A New Job Description for the Battered Women's Prosecutor and Other More
Modest Proposals, 7 U.C.L.A. WoMEN's L.J. 183 (1097) (questioning mandatory arrest
policies and arguing need for flexible response to domestic violence); Barbara J. Hart,
Arrest: What's the Big Deal, 3 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 207 (1997) (arguing that the
response to domestic violence should have several goals, including increased agency of
victims). In addition to allowing the victim to regain her sense of autonomy, victim control
over domestic violence remedies is important where the victim has reason to believe the
perpetrator, because of his race, will be treated unfairly by the criminal justice system and is
therefore especially reluctant to seek legal redress.
164. Frantz, supra note 63, at 1357; see also id. at 1363 (quoting United States v. Hall,
26 F. Cas. 79, 81-82 (C.C.S.D. Ala. 1871) ("[I]t would be unseemly for congress to inter-
fere directly with state enactments, and as it cannot compel the activity of state officials, the
only appropriate legislation it can make is that which will operate directly on offenders and
offenses.")).
165. See Brzonkala, 169 F.3d at 883.
166. See supra notes 61-66 and accompanying text (discussing the Brzonkala court's
rejection of the argument that Section 5 empowers Congress to regulate private action).
167. See Brzonkala, 169 F.3d at 884-85. To buttress this point, the court suggested that
congressional findings of state discrimination were undermined because the Act gave state
courts concurrent jurisdiction over civil rights claims and because other portions of the Act
appropriated funds that would be used to give grants to states to help reduce violence
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tion 5 legislation exclusively toward the states, the court gave some
consideration to the possibility that "enforcing" equal protection of the
laws could mean filling in where the state had failed, not just directly cor-
recting the state's violation. The court complained, however, that the rem-
edy was not properly tailored to compensate for the equal protection
violation: recovery hinges on the perpetrator's actions rather than on how
well the state responds to the crime.' 6 8 The problem with this argument is
that it treats each crime as an incident unto itself, not as part of a group-
based civil rights problem. A particular victim suffers from the state's ne-
glect not only because the state handles her complaint poorly but because
the state's neglect of past cases legitimized future rapes and may have
made them more likely to occur.16 9
The Fourth Circuit's stronger argument is that VAWA fails the "pro-
portionality" prong of City of Boerne. The court pointed out that the civil
rights remedy is not limited in any way that is tied to whether the states'
performance of their duties improves over the long term, or whether partic-
ular states are already performing well. 170 The cause of action would con-
tinue to exist even in a state whose diligence in enforcing sex-crimes laws
was everything one could ask. Whether these flaws require VAWA to be
struck down, however, is not clear. Instead, the court could have looked at
the Act "as applied" by considering whether the equality concerns that led
Congress to enact the civil rights remedy are present in Virginia. This
venture, however, would probably be beyond the capabilities of a court.
Therefore, the lack of temporal or geographic restrictions on the civil rights
remedy would have to be justified by arguing that the problems Congress
sought to correct are so widespread that no limitations are appropriate at
the moment.
17 1
against women. See id. at 885-86. This critique, which fails to recognize that states are not
unitary entities, is typical of the opinion's tendency to nit-pick Congress's findings and
policy choices. See id. at 914 ("The majority does not assert that these findings lack docu-
mentation or power. Instead, it nitpicks them.") (footnote omitted) (Motz, J., dissenting).
168. See id. at 885, 887 (noting that the civil rights remedy is available "without regard
to whether the State failed adequately to investigate or prosecute the case because of bias or
discrimination").
169. See Schick, supra note 115, at 925 (citing S. REP. No. 103-138 at 37-38, 41-44
(1993), finding that state inaction increases rates of rape and domestic violence). On the
effect of the fear of rape on women's lives, see Stellings, supra note 107; see also
Brownmiller, supra note 106.
170. See Brzonkala, 169 F.3d at 887; cf Frantz, supra note 63, at 1359 (summarizing
theory that laws to enforce equal protection cannot "operat[e] uniformly regardless of the
role played by the state").
171. This argument would not be as difficult to make as the Fourth Circuit suggests. The
Brzonkala opinion scoffed at the suggestion that state laws maintain inequality by noting,
for example, that at the time VAWA was enacted, forty-seven states criminalized marital
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The Fourth Circuit's insistence on seeing VAWA's civil rights remedy
as a law that intrudes on state regulation of "domestic relations" led it to
miss a more important problem with the congruence between the Act and
the Equal Protection Clause. The goal of enforcing equal protection does
not fit well with other crimes clearly reached by VAWA's definition of
"gender-motivated" crimes. Although murder, unlike sexual assault,
would not be presumptively gender-motivated, a victim of a classic bias
crime-such as the massacre of female engineering students in a Montreal
university classroom by a man shouting that he hated feminists '-would
be able to show gender-motivation. Although this incident is not a typical
case of gender-motivated crime, it fits the classic model of a hate crime,
and Congress clearly wanted VAWA to reach such a case. But there is no
indication that murder laws are under-enforced when the victim is female
and the perpetrator is a stranger to her, so it is hard to see how an equal
protection rationale for VAWA could enable Congress to reach this
situation.
B. Would He Have Beaten His Wife if She Were a Man, or What is
"Animus Based on Gender"?
The cases not reached by the categorical approach indicate that the
real problem with gender-motivated violence is only in part that the state
fails in its response. As defined in VAWA, a "crime of violence motivated
by gender" is one that is "committed because of gender or on the basis of
gender, and due, at least in part, to an animus based on the victim's gen-
der." '173 When a gender-motivated crime occurs, the person who harms the
victim's dignity and status in society is the perpetrator of the crime, not the
state. The states have largely failed to act against the bias element of gen-
der-motivated crimes-most state hate-crime statutes exclude sex from
their lists of protected characteristics.' 74 However, there is no indication
that the Equal Protection Clause requires states to provide enhanced penal-
ties for bias-motivated crimes. It also seems unlikely that the Court would
consider the exclusion of "sex" from statutes aimed at other kinds of bias,
such as race, to be invidious discrimination.'75 Nonetheless, gender-moti-
rape. See Brzonkala, 169 F.3d at 887. The court did not consider whether or how marital
rape was treated differently from other rapes by the statutes themselves or by prosecutors
and juries. See supra notes 117-18 (describing typical modem statutes on marital rape and
interspousal torts).
172. See Katherine Chen, Including Gender in Bias Crime Statutes: Feminist and Evolu-
tionary Perspectives, 3 WM & MARy J. WomEN & L. 277 (1997).
173. 42 U.S.C. § 13981(d)(1) (1998).
174. See S. REP. No. 103-138, at 48 (1993); Schick, supra note 115 at 898, n.67.
175. The Supreme Court has held that a state may punish invidious discrimination in
selecting the victim of a violent crime. See Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476 (1993)
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vated crime harms women's civil rights. 76 Rather than as an attempt to
enforce the Equal Protection Clause, Congress's invocation of the Four-
teenth Amendment and its declaration that "[a]ll persons within the United
States shall have the right to be free from crimes of violence motivated by
gender"' 77 is better understood as a measure to fulfill the promise that
"[a]ll persons born or naturalized in the United States ... are citizens." '178
Under Justice Harlan's approach to the Citizenship Clause, described
in Part IV, the duty to remedy invidious private discrimination rests in the
first instance with the states, because the right to be free of discrimination
is an aspect of state citizenship. However, even the rights of state citizen-
ship take on a federal quality because state citizenship is, in Justice
Harlan's words, a "grant from the nation."' 79 The accompanying rights
include the right to enjoy the same liberties as all citizens, and when one
group threatens to subordinate, or continue subordinating, another, the fed-
eral government can take action against discriminatory denials of liberty.
The bias element of an attack implicates federal concerns for citizenship:
In addition to constituting an assault on fundamental public or-
der, [a hate crime] attacks the ongoing process of institutional-
izing a pattern of pluralism . . . . [This explains] the vague
assertions of Reconstruction legislators and judges about a dis-
tinction between ordinary crimes and crimes that deprive one of
one's civil rights, a distinction which seems so hard to make
when rights are looked upon solely as the accoutrements of indi-
vidual dignity.'
(holding that defendant's punishment could be enhanced because he intentionally selected
his victim on the basis of race).
176. The Senate heard testimony that "[u]ntil women as a class have the same protection
offered others who are objects of irrational hate-motivated abuse and assault, we as a soci-
ety should be ashamed." S. REP. No. 103-138, at 49 (1993) (quoting testimony of Illinois
Attorney General Roland Burris).
177. 42 U.S.C. § 13981(a)-(b) (1998).
178. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, §1, cl.1. The danger in basing VAWA on the Citizenship
Clause is the possible inference that plaintiffs would have to be citizens. There are two
responses to this problem. First, aliens in the United States are generally entitled to receive
the same common law protections that citizens receive from the state. Second, Congress
has the power, even under the Citizenship Clause, to extend VAWA's civil rights remedy to
aliens because one of the major reasons the remedy exists is the group harm that is done to
women as a class by patterns of gender-motivated violence. When rape, domestic violence,
and more classic hate crimes occur in ways that target the victims as and because they are
women, the material impact on the lives and status of women as a group does not hinge on
whether the victim was a citizen.
179. See supra text accompanying note 151; see also CIA RL.as BLACK, A NEW BIRTH OF
FREEDOM: HuMAN RIGrrs, NAMED AND UNNAMED 48-52 (1997).
180. FREDERICK P. Lawis, THE DILEMMA IN THE CONGRESSIONAL POWER To ENFORCr3
THE FouR-Emrn AMNDamr 72 (1980).
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The special harm caused by a bias crime is recognized in United States v.
Cruikshank, which ordered dismissal of charges for attacking two black
men, in interference with their rights, on the grounds that the rights to
assemble, to bear arms, and to receive due process of law were not rights of
national citizenship."' But the Court found it necessary to point out that
there was no allegation that the defendants had acted because of the race of
their victims. 182 The negative implication is "that Congress might be able
to add something to the rights of one individual against another, at least
where a race motive is involved."' 83 The Supreme Court has since en-
dorsed a federal civil rights remedy for victims of racially motivated vio-
lence, as one of the badges and incidents of slavery that Congress may
proscribe under the Thirteenth Amendment.' 84 The VAWA civil rights
remedy applies the same approach to gender-motivated crimes.
As a parallel to a law intended to eliminate a feature of race-based
subjugation, VAWA is best grounded in a constitutional provision that
guarantees women's status, the Citizenship Clause, rather than one that
guarantees only neutral treatment by the state. The test, then, for VAWA's
constitutionality is whether the civil rights remedy is a "congruent" and
"proportional" response to threats to women's status as citizens. One pos-
sible problem with its "proportionality" is that, even under Justice Harlan's
approach, Congress may be required to key its action to failures on the part
of the states. Rather than focusing on whether the states adequately en-
force neutral laws, however, the Citizenship Clause approach allows Con-
gress to consider directly whether the states are responding adequately to
gender-bias crime.'85 Most states have failed to identify gender-motivated
violence as a hate crime,' 8 6 but it may be necessary to exempt from
VAWA's civil rights remedy those crimes that occur in the exceptional
states. However, in order for a state to qualify for this exception, it must
not only include "sex" as a protected characteristic in its hate-crime statute,
but also enforce this provision in a manner tailored not only to classic hate
181. United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 551-53 (1875).
182. See generally Frantz, supra note 63, at 1372.
183. Id.
184. See Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88 (1971).
185. Cf. Tobias, supra note 118, at 476-77 (arguing that ordinary tort remedy individual-
izes crime, obscuring gender discrimination inherent in it); Frazee, supra note 107, at 181
(discussing difficulties in applying a traditional framework for bias-motivated crime to gen-
der-motivated violence). A Senate Report, stretching to justify the Act under the Equal
Protection Clause, asserts that because state laws "by their nature cannot provide a national
antidiscrimination standard," the existence of state remedies is not a bar to the VAWA civil
rights remedy. S. RE. No. 103-138, at 51 (1993).
186. See Schick, supra note 115, at 898 n.67 (noting that hate-crime statutes included
gender as a protected criterion in only eleven states in 1994 and that, in some of those
states, gender was included only in certain portions of statute).
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crimes-conspiracies to commit violence against strangers chosen only for
their race or other targeted characteristic-but to the kind of violence
targeted by VAWA and most central to women's subordination.
187
Whether the civil rights remedy is "congruent" to threats to women's
equal status depends on what Congress meant when it created the right to
be free of "gender-motivated" crimes of violence. The question of what
qualifies as a gender-motivated crime under VAWA is not yet settled, and
it seems to cause more confusion than the idea of racially motivated
crime.188 Some approaches to the problem of defining gender animus
threaten to undermine VAWA's goal that "crimes against women [not] be
... dismissed because of the relationships that [spawn] them," '189 reinforc-
ing rather than eliminating the remnants of women's past legal subordina-
tion. In the view of at least one member of Congress, a showing of animus,
in addition to gender-motivation, is necessary under VAWA because sin-
gling a person out on the basis of her gender to be the victim of a violent
crime can indicate either animus or love, depending on the circum-
stances. 190 Stereotypes suggesting that only "real rape ' 19 1 by a stranger is
motivated by gender animus have shown up in one judicial opinion.192
Most courts, however, have indicated willingness to define gender animus
broadly, at least on summary judgment. They have refused to equate ani-
mus with dislike19 3 and have rejected defendants' arguments that their ac-
187. See Frazee, supra note 107, at 190-95 (criticizing Anti-Defamation League for deci-
sion to exclude gender-based crime from model hate-crime statute and discussing inade-
quacy of classic hate-crime model for dealing with violence against women).
188. Both kinds of laws have, however, raised fears that congressional response to bias
crimes will intrude on traditional state tort and criminal law. See Jones, An Argument for
Federal Protection, supra note 134, at 722.
189. Nourse, supra note 116, at 2.
190. Senator Hatch, a co-sponsor of VAWA, believes, "If a man rapes a woman while
telling her he loves her, that's a far cry from saying he hates her. A lust factor does not
spring from animus." Jennifer Gaffney, Amending the Violence Against Women Act: Creat-
ing a Rebuttable Presumption of Gender Animus in Rape Cases, 6 J.L. & POL'Y 247, 259
(1997) (quoting from Ruth Shalit, Caught in the Act; Congress; Violence Against Women
Act of 1993, NEW REPUBLIC, July 12, 1993, at 12). In contrast, Senator Biden stated, "The-
oretically, I guess, a rape could take place that was not driven by gender animus, but I can't
think of what it would be." Id. at 260 (quoting from Shalit, at 12). As noted below, the
federal courts appear so far to lean towards Senator Biden's view.
191. See Susan Estrich, Rape, 95 YALE L.J. 1087, 1092 (1986) (describing race and
gender stereotypes in the law's conception of rape).
192. See Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic & State Univ., 935 F. Supp. 779, 784 (W.D.
Va. 1997), aff'd en banc, 169 F.3d 820 (4th Cir. 1999), cert. granted, _ S. Ct. - (1999).
The court noted that it did not need to decide whether VAWA covered other rapes, such as
acquaintance rape, which it viewed as less egregious than stranger rape.
193. See Doe v. Hartz, 970 F. Supp. 1375, 1406-09 (N.D. Iowa 1997) (stating that "forc-
ing physical intimacy on a woman" is not a "signal of affection" but is "illustrative of a lack
of respect for women"), rev'd on other grounds, 134 F.3d 1339 (8th Cir. 1997); see also
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tions, including rape, "demonstrate affinity, not animus, towards women"
and towards their victims in particular.
194
The problem of what kinds of attacks on women reflect gender ani-
mus is analogous to some problems in the law of sexual harassment. In-
deed, Congress indicated that interpretation of VAWA should be guided by
Title VII jurisprudence. This is not a helpful instruction. While sexual
harassment of a woman by a man has generally been assumed to be sex
discrimination under Title VII, recent confusion over male victim and
same-sex cases has led to re-examination of why that assumption is war-
ranted. Professor Katherine Franke has proposed an approach particularly
appropriate for VAWA, focusing on whether the act in question enforces
stereotypical gender roles. 195 To apply this method and treat VAWA as a
mandate to protect women's status as citizens, courts would look at the
history of how citizenship has been denied, and refuse to adopt the same
methods in applying VAWA. For example, domestic violence is one of the
primary ways in which women have been subordinated to men, and it had
the sanction of the law for quite some time. Yet, "[h]ow can a married
woman prove that her husband [attacked her] her not as an individual per-
son, but as a woman?"'196 To answer this question, it is necessary to distin-
guish gender-motivation and animus from consciously articulated intent to
discriminate. "Many men still believe that a woman has to obey her hus-
band's wishes and as a consequence consider themselves justified to use
violence." '97 Such men do not perceive themselves as acting out of gender
animus. 191 However, the belief that women must obey men is itself a state-
ment of disrespect for women, and effecting this belief through violence
subordinates the victim on the basis of her sex. Domestic violence "is
Anisimov v. Lake, 982 F. Supp. 531 (N.D. Ill. 1997). Under this standard for summary
judgment, gender animus becomes a question for the jury, and there are not yet any pub-
lished cases dealing with jury instructions for this element of a VAWA claim.
194. Mattison v. Click Corp. of America, No. 97-CV-2736, 1998 WL 32597, *7 (E.D.
Pa. Jan. 27, 1998).
195. Katherine M. Franke, What's Wrong With Sexual Harassment?, 49 STAN. L. REv.
691, 693 (1997). In Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc., 118 S.Ct. 998 (1998), the
Supreme Court may have endorsed this approach by holding male-on-male sexual harass-
ment to be actionable under Title VII regardless of the perpetrator's sexual orientation.
However, the Court's short opinion offered very little guidance on how such claims should
be adjudicated, and it could be read as requiring a pure nondiscrimination standard.
196. Birgit Schmidt am Busch, Domestic Violence and Title III of the Violence Against
Women Act of 1993: A Feminist Critique, 6 HAsTINGs WoMEN's L.J. 1, 17 (1995).
197. Id. at 14.
198. See id. at 14 (stating that "existing stereotypes about family and women are the
underlying cause for abusive behavior in intimate relationships" and that "[tihe intent stan-
dard would fail to address civil rights deprivations coming from such stereotypes") (citing
SUSAN SCHECHTER, WOMEN AND MALE VIoLENcE 209 (1982)).
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often precipitated by women's noncompliance with gender require-
ments."199 Sometimes a family fight may be just a fight, and the weakness
of human nature means that some fights will become physical. However, a
"fight" in which one person disciplines another for failing to comply with a
subordinate gender role is an illegitimate assertion of sovereignty over a
fellow citizen on the basis of her sex, which is a civil rights problem.
The above discussion has assumed a male perpetrator and a female
victim. This assumption is necessary initially because the basis for Con-
gress's action is the goal of eliminating the subordination of women, as a
class, to men, as a class. This does not mean that a man can never be a
VAWA plaintiff or a woman a defendant, or even that Congress could con-
stitutionally limit the remedy in that way. Congress, constrained by the
equality component of the Fifth Amendment, can take note of and remedy
historical inequalities between groups, but rarely can it classify individuals
according to suspect or "disfavored ' " 0 criteria. In the "reverse" cases, the
idea of gender animus is likely to be even more confusing to courts, as it
has been in sexual harassment cases. Gender and sexual violence are
closely linked to sex itself, and gender animus often gets mixed up with
sexual love. Professor Franke's model for identifying the discrimination in
sexual harassment was developed explicitly to help understand when "re-
verse" cases should be covered by Title VII by focusing on whether the
defendant imposed subordinating gender roles on the plaintiff. For exam-
ple, the element of gender motivation would be satisfied in many cases of
male-on-male rape in which the defendants "'feminize' their male victims
in the process" of the crime.20 1 It is the "sex-based violent masculinity of
the rapist" that constitutes the animus of the act,20 2 a conception of mascu-
linity that is very much a part of the subordination of women, despite the
fact that the victim of the rape is male. This approach, applied to VAWA,
would not be a perfect criminal justice response to cases with male victims,
female perpetrators, or both. To some extent this is because, as in sexual
harassment cases, it is more difficult for courts to identify the dynamics.
However, in some of these cases, as in some of the cases with male perpe-
trators and female victims, the failure to respond will be the right outcome.
199. MAcKINNON, THEORY OF THE STATE, supra note 142, at 178 (citing R. Emerson
Dobash & Russell Dobash, Violence Against Wives: A Case Against the Patriarchy (1979)).
200. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 217 (1976) (adopting intermediate scrutiny for
sex-based classifications); but see United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533 (1996)
(holding that government must have "exceedingly persuasive" justification for sex-based
classification); id. at 570-76 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (criticizing the "exceedingly persuasive"
standard and accusing the Court of raising the level of scrutiny for sex-based
classifications).
201. Stellings, supra note 107, at 196.
202. Frazee, supra note 107, at 223.
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Aggression and violence are part of the human condition, and there will be
"residual" cases of domestic violence that do not qualify under VAWA. To
the extent that VAWA is a response to domestic violence, it is not a re-
sponse to domestic violence generally but to domestic violence as a tool for
subjugating women to men. If it is interpreted that way, it will be congru-
ent to a Fourteenth Amendment problem and a valid use of Congress's
power to enforce the Citizenship Clause.
VI. Conclusion
Women's subordination to men has, in the course of history, been
facilitated by the state and its legal system. However, state-sanctioned dis-
crimination is not the most fundamental obstacle to women's equality, and
a feminist conception of democracy requires a state that can assume re-
sponsibility for promoting the freedom and autonomy of its citizens.
While much of our legal tradition has assumed that citizens encounter each
other in the public square as equals, the Civil War Amendments responded
to the falsity of this assumption when a particular class of people is
targeted for subordination. For a federal guarantee of citizenship-both
state and national-to have meaning, Congress must be able to respond to
the modem continuations of class-based subordination that recently had the
sanction of law. Exercise of this power is limited by the congruence of
Congress's remedy both to the harm and to a reasonable conception of
citizenship. Protecting women from gender-motivated violence is a fitting
use of this power, since it responds to women's historic subordination
through their sex and as an aspect of their status in families.
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